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A nuclear threshold state is one that could quickly operationalize its “peaceful” nuclear 
program into one capable of producing a nuclear weapon. This thesis compares two 
known threshold states, Japan and Brazil, with Iran to determine if the Islamic Republic 
could also be labeled a threshold state. Furthermore, it highlights the implications such a 
status could have on U.S. nonproliferation policy. Although Iran’s nuclear program is 
mired in controversy, it relates to those of Japan and Brazil. While not maintaining as 
robust of a program and often conflicting with the international community, Iran has the 
capabilities to produce weapons grade material and could be considered a nuclear 
threshold state. Dozens of countries in the world have similar nuclear capabilities and 
maintain the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty rights to advance their nuclear programs 
so long as they are peacefully applied. Unfortunately for nonproliferation advocates, 
these capabilities make fuel for both energy and weapons. To prevent proliferation and 
eliminate the world’s nuclear weapons arsenal, the United States will need to alter its 
policy and convince the world that nuclear weapons should be abolished. Although this 
task includes a multitude of variables, incremental steps can be taken toward the 
administration’s final goal.   
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates the objective of Iran’s nuclear program and its effect on 
U.S. nonproliferation policy. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether and/or how Iran 
is attempting to become a nuclear threshold state—a state that could quickly 
operationalize its “peaceful” nuclear program into one capable of producing a nuclear 
weapon. To investigate this question, the thesis will compare Iran’s nuclear program with 
those of Brazil and Japan, both of which are considered threshold states, to determine if 
differences and similarities define Iranian intentions.1 Given Iran’s past practices and 
behavior, it is difficult to ascertain its true motives. Although Iran refrains from 
publically committing to nuclear weapons, remains within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and has recently become less bellicose in its rhetoric, it has often times 
challenged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international 
nonproliferation principles, remaining steadfastly committed to its perceived right to the 
full nuclear fuel cycle. 
This thesis will also consider the implications of this case study and analysis for 
U.S. nonproliferation policy more generally in regard to the problem of nuclear threshold 
states. In particular, research will focus on how the United States has approached Iran’s 
program and what amendments should be instituted in order to prevent proliferation 
among the growing number of states that are likely to use nuclear power in the future. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Pursued by a growing number of states, nuclear energy programs are being 
seriously considered by at least 45 countries.2 Regardless of these programs’ motives, 
                                                 
1 Maria Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil 
and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (March 2010), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_171_rost_ 
rublee.pdf. 




each contributes to an increased potential for nuclear weapons proliferation. George 
Quester explains that there are numerous approaches to proliferation, and that it is 
impossible to know for sure which countries that have the capability to cross the 
threshold will cross it.3 Furthermore, while certain specialty technologies are required to 
construct a bomb, much of the same equipment and materials used in peaceful nuclear 
programs are used in the production of nuclear weapons. 
Within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under Article IV have the “inalienable 
right” to research, produce, exchange, and use nuclear equipment and energy as long as it 
remains peaceful in nature or involves a non-proscribed military use, such as naval 
propulsion.4 Article IV also allows NPT non-nuclear nations to explore and achieve 
nuclear fuel-cycle mastery. As long as a nation adheres to the NPT, it can legally reach 
the threshold.  
Due to the manner in which nuclear weapons grade material can be produced, it is 
curious why so many countries have not stepped over the threshold and joined the nuclear 
weapons club. Although maintaining and improving on their robust nuclear programs, 
Brazil and Japan have remained on the brink for different reasons. Although many argue 
that security is the primary driver of proliferation, domestic factors often maintain a 
significant and influential role in directing official decisions. International constraints 
both within and outside the NPT also affect proliferation decisions. The success or failure 
of international efforts to influence these decisions remains vital to the survival of the 
NPT. If Tehran does acquire nuclear weapons, it could become a model for other 
developing countries that might exploit their NPT rights to acquire their own weapons 
capabilities and then leave the regime. 
                                                 
3 George H. Quester, “Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold Status,” in Security with Nuclear Weapons?: 
Different Perspectives on National Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 212.  
4 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Power 
(Vienna: IAEA, 1970), 3, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; 
James Clay Moltz, “Closing the NPT Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 6, no. 1 (1998), 108–09, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/cmoltz61.pdf. 
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Iran is particularly important because it signed and ratified the NPT prior to 
developing an advanced program, similar to the position of many current non-weapon 
states. The process by which Iran has advanced its nuclear program and the precedent set 
for other emergent nuclear powers poses a threat to the future of nonproliferation efforts. 
Although U.S. nonproliferation policy utilizes the NPT and international norms, it may 
have over-relied on unilateral leverage and denial of technology to contain and reduce the 
threat of proliferation.5 Recently, the Obama administration and international community 
have diplomatically engaged the Iranian regime and appear to be making headway on 
their objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Having been exposed 
to diverse methods of prevention including isolation, sanctions, threats of military attack, 
and diplomacy, Iran offers lessons on how the United States should proceed with its 
nonproliferation policy to prevent others from being able to exploit loopholes within the 
nonproliferation regime. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
Two possible outcomes developed by comparing Iran’s nuclear program with 
those of Brazil and Japan include a continued effort to advance its program, ultimately 
defying the NPT and other nonproliferation regime elements such as export controls, 
IAEA and international safeguards, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 
and unveil a nuclear weapon. Conversely, Iran could continue on its current path, but stop 
short of nuclear weapons by remaining at the brink of proliferation. Regardless of Iran’s 
final position within the proliferation continuum, U.S. policy will have to change not only 
in regards to Iran, but in its approach to prevent future threshold and proliferator states. 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Wendy Sherman averred in a written 
statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. nonproliferation 
policy towards Iran needs to be carried out multilaterally.6 Multilateral consensus 
                                                 
5 Gerard C. Smith and George W. Rathjens, “Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy.” Foreign 
Affairs 59, no. 4 (1981), 886–87, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/20040826.pdf? 
acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true. 
6 U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Written Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (statement of Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), 
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2013/202684.htm. 
 4 
validates nonproliferation efforts. In addition, the United States uses a dual-tracked 
strategy that consists of sanctions and diplomacy with the possibility of sanction relief 
through compromise. Although some believe that Iran committed to negotiations because 
of sanctions, Kenneth Katzman states that sanction have not had the desired effect of 
slowing Iranian progress. He explains that Iran has developed more sophisticated 
centrifuges, advanced its enrichment program, and improved its ballistic missile and 
other weapons systems.7 In addition, Kayhan Barzegar explains that sanctions “degrade 
Iran’s political equality” and makes them skeptical of the usefulness of negotiations.8 
Etel Solingen adds that broad sanctions miss their intended targets and strengthen 
hardliner resolve.9 
Regarding nonproliferation efforts for future nuclear powers, each of the 45 
countries interested in nuclear power represent proliferation threats. As these countries 
invest in their nuclear infrastructure, they will inevitably acquire dual-use material. While 
acquisition of dual-use material does not guarantee nuclear weapons generation, as 
additional technologies, expertise, facilities, and systems are required, they do present a 
nuclear foundation from which to expand. To prevent future Irans, a panel of 
nonproliferation experts hosted by Henry Sokolski discussed the need for congressional 
approval for future nuclear cooperation agreements and that rules for cooperation must be 
universal and indiscriminate. Congressman Brad Sherman, Ranking Member, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, explained that NPT 
enforcement needs to be “immediate and severe” and that future cooperation should abide 
by the established “UAE standard” that restricts enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities.10 
                                                 
7 Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (CRS Report No. RS20871) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2014), 49–50, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf. 
8 Kayhan Barzegar, “Sanctions Won’t End Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in Iran and the Bomb: Solving 
the Persian Puzzle, ed. Gideon Rose and Jonathan Tepperman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2012), 160. 
9 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 295. 
10 Henry Sokolski, “Avoiding Future Irans: A New Course for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, December 11, 2013, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid= 
1239&rtid=9. 
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Although Iran’s, Brazil’s, and Japan’s nuclear programs have demonstrated 
different trajectories, none of them currently possess nuclear weapons. Despite Iran’s 
denouncement of nuclear weapons, its deviant behavior including covert facilities and 
activities may suggest an ambitious pursuit of weapons. In the first hypothesis, Iran 
would not only withdraw from the NPT, but also deviate from the desires of its 
population. While Iranians encourage their government to pursue nuclear energy, they 
have demonstrated less enthusiasm about nuclear weapons. In 2004, Karim Sadjadpour 
explained that while few Iranians opposed nuclear energy development, a majority 
expressed fear that a nuclear weapon would expose Iran’s vulnerability and increase 
hardliner power.11 Michael Herzog of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
conducted a similar analysis in 2006, in which he stated that anxiety caused by nuclear 
weapons increased from 34 percent in older adults to more than 50 percent among 16–24 
year olds.12 A November 2013 Gallup poll showed that 68 percent of Iranians favored the 
continuation of their nuclear program, while only 34 percent approved nuclear power for 
military applications.13 
While the histories of all three countries’ programs differ, commonalities exist. 
First, all three are non-nuclear weapon states that signed and ratified the NPT. All 
continue to expand their programs and capabilities. All three are sensitive to their 
domestic populations and political climates and not driven solely by security concerns.14 
Furthermore, all three claim that the NPT is discriminatory towards non-nuclear weapon  
 
                                                 
11 Karim Sadjadpour, “Iranians Don’t Want to Go Nuclear,” The Washington Post, February 3, 2004, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/iranians-dont-want-to-
go-nuclear.aspx. 
12 Michael Herzog, Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the 
International Community (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 3–4, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus56.pdf. 
13 Jay Loschky, “Most Iranians Say Sanctions Hurting Their Livelihoods,” Gallup World, November 
6, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/165743/iranians-say-sanctions-hurting-livelihoods.aspx?utm_source= 
alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=syndication&utm_content=morelink&utm_term=All%20Gallu
p%20Headlines. 
14 Rublee, “Nuclear Threshold States,” 54, 58; Sajadpour, “Iranians Don’t Want.” 
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states, and the nuclear weapon states perform too little in terms of disarmament.15 
Finally, they view that achieving and maintaining the option is a bargaining chip for 
interests beyond their nuclear programs. 
Brazil and Iran are often times compared to the Japanese “threshold state” model. 
More recently, Iran’s path has the potential to become an inspiration for many in the 
developing world. This could pose a significant counterweight to the Japanese model, 
which is associated with strong adherence to the NPT and nonproliferation norms. While 
Iran challenges the NPT and international community, it fights for its rights and 
progressing in the face of severe sanctions and military threats.  
For U.S. nonproliferation efforts, the Iran path poses a peculiar challenge in that 
some states may emulate its approach to nuclear independence. With the constant focus 
on rights under the NPT, some may believe that mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle should 
be pursued. The main problem for the United States and international community would 
be a future in which many nations conduct nuclear programs similar to that of Iran. How 
would the United States and the rest of the world cope? Although each case is unique, the 
United States should lead global nonproliferation efforts that consider multilateral 
engagement, places developing countries such as South Africa, Kazakhstan, Argentina, or 
Brazil in lead dialogue roles, promotes common interests, and understands that external 
factors often shape domestic sentiment but are often not the sole or primary drivers that 
influence decision makers. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The next section of this thesis will provide general information on what it means 
to be a nuclear threshold state and relate the importance of dual-use materials and 
capabilities and intentions. The next three sections will focus on the nuclear programs of 
Japan, Brazil, and Iran. Each section will describe the individual nuclear histories of the 
country’s program, current capabilities, and internal and external factors that have 
influenced decision makers. The Japan and Brazil sections will demonstrate that they are 
                                                 
15 Rublee, “Nuclear Threshold States,” 64; Shahram Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear 
Program,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 2010, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program. 
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threshold states, while the Iran section will be compared to these two in order to 
determine if it will likely follow Brazilian or Japanese nuclear postures. The final section 
will focus on Iran’s program and the implications for U.S. nonproliferation policy. In 
addition to explaining U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy, this section will 
offer policy recommendations for the United States to effectively counter would be 
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II. THRESHOLD DEFINED 
Various definitions and concepts are used to describe nuclear threshold states. 
Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel describe them as opaque, ambiguous, and latent;16 
Etel Solingen terms nations at the threshold as fence-sitters;17 George Quester uses 
“bomb in the basement;”18 Michel Fortmann uses the terms “impulsive, muddling 
through,” “nuclear captives,” and “pariah states” to describe the different approaches 
toward the threshold;19 and Maria Rost Rublee defines nuclear threshold states as “those 
that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capabilities.”20 This 
thesis combines aspects from various definitions and determines a threshold state to be 
one that could quickly operationalize its “peaceful” nuclear program into one capable of 
producing a nuclear weapon. 
Cohen and Frankel use the term opaque to describe “second generation nuclear 
proliferators.”21 These countries not only suppress information and knowledge about their 
programs, but also conduct proliferation efforts “underground” while professing loyalty 
to nonproliferation efforts.22 Similar to others, Cohen and Frankel label programs as 
ambiguous because of the unavailability of information, or the indecisive nature of a 
nation’s leadership. They believe that ambiguity most accurately describes a situation in 
which “an openly non-nuclear weapon country is known to possess a substantial nuclear 
infrastructure, including reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, while there is reason to 
                                                 
16 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
13, no.3 (1990), 18–23, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402399008437417. 
17 Etel Solingen, The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing ‘Fence-Sitters’ in the Post-
Cold War Era (IGCC Policy Paper 8) (Irvine, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, 
1994), http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/501216.pdf. 
18 Quester, “Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold,” 212–213. 
19 Michel Fortmann, “The Other Side of Midnight: Opaque Proliferation Revisited.” International 
Journal 48, no. 1 (1992/1993), 151–75. http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/40202824.pdf 
?acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true. 
20 Rublee, “Nuclear Threshold States,” 50. 
21 Cohen and Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 14. 
22 Ibid., 17. 
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suspect this capability has weapon implication.”23 Likewise, Quester explains that the 
growing availability of nuclear knowledge, expertise, and accumulation of nuclear 
technology offers options to decision makers. Furthermore, he asserts that the ambiguous 
nature, in which some states pursue the threshold, is a means to an end rather than an end 
in itself.24 
The third term Cohen and Frankel use to describe threshold programs is latency. 
In this case, a country, consciously or unconsciously, has progressed closer to nuclear 
weapons than it would have with no nuclear program at all. Although a nuclear program 
may have begun without the intention of weapons, its progress offers such an option.25 
Among many others, the Council on Foreign Relations explains that Japan and Brazil, 
non-nuclear weapon states, possess a latent nuclear weapons capability. Due to its 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, Japan is considered to have the most robust 
nuclear program. Yet the country dismisses prospects of proliferation due to its 
commitment to nonproliferation and opposition to nuclear weapons.26 Although the 
Council on Foreign Relations cites Brazil as the maintainer of the most advanced nuclear 
program in Latin America and a strong proponent of nonproliferation efforts, it shows 
concern in the country’s support for Iran and Brazil’s denial of International Atomic 
Energy Agency inspection of its centrifuges.27 The Council on Foreign Relations also 
suggested that Iran’s uranium enrichment capability could be used for weapons 
production.28 
Etel Solingen labels fence-sitters as states that simultaneously remain 
uncommitted to the nonproliferation regime and nuclear weapons production. This 
dichotomy also extends to the expectations from the fence-sitter and international 
community. Where the fence-sitter expects to be included in global concerns, the 
                                                 
23 Cohen and Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 19. 
24 Quester, “Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold,” 209. 
25 Cohen and Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 19–20. 





international community expects the fence-sitter to adhere to the NPT and any other 
nonproliferation obligations. She explains that these types of states, which maintain 
varied levels of capabilities, delay making final decisions regarding an end state of their 
nuclear program.29 She contends that domestic politics, rather than external pressures, 
have a greater influence on nuclear decisions. This occurs because nuclear weapons 
possession has the potential to degrade, rather than enhance national security. 
Furthermore, a nuclear program is not only monetarily expensive, but also costly in terms 
of international reaction, which potentially includes sanctions, isolation, and military 
intervention.30 
Quester also adds that a country with “bombs in the basement” is considered to be 
on the threshold. Quester’s position holds that the components of a nuclear weapon are 
possessed by an individual state, but remain disassembled, untested, and absent of any 
formal admission that weapons exist.31 Describing a bomb in the basement as “possessing 
the material and means” to produce nuclear weapons, Robert Windrem of NBC News 
explains that because of its advanced nuclear program and large stockpiles of plutonium 
and enriched uranium, China considers Japan to have bombs in the basement, and that 
plans for further plutonium production and stockpiling is worrisome. China also 
concludes that Japan could produce a large arsenal within two years from the time of a 
decision.32 Likewise, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified that Iran 
has the “scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear 
weapons,” but it is unknown if it will ever decide to build such a device.33 
Although the definitions offered by Rublee and others contain variations, there is 
consensus that capabilities and intentions are important in the direction of a nuclear 
                                                 
29 Solingen, Domestic Sources, 9. 
30 Ibid., 4–5. 
31 Quester, “Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold,” 212. 
32 Robert Windrem, “Japan Has Nuclear ‘Bomb in the Basement,’ and China Isn’t Happy,” NBC 
News, March 11, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-
bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976. 
33 James Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Statement for the 
Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, 5–6, http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf. 
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program and that remaining on the threshold, similar to its crossing, serves political 
interests ranging from bargaining chips to security concerns. Whereas capabilities are the 
physical attributes of a program, intentions are the political decisions based on those 
capabilities. 
A. DUAL-USE MATERIAL AND CAPABILITIES 
A characteristic of nuclear programs that concern nonproliferation advocates is 
the utilization of dual-use technologies and materials. In this context, dual-use means that 
these elements are used in both civilian and military applications. Although possession of 
dual-use items used for civilian programs can be applied to a weapons program, their 
possession does not automatically translate into a weapons commitment. The Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states in Article IV that parties to the treaty 
“have the inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes.”34 Moreover, certain specialty technologies are required to 
construct a bomb. 
Two avenues to make nuclear fuel or weapons material are uranium (U) and 
plutonium (Pu). Uranium occurs naturally, and in order to be used in reactors, it must be 
mined, milled, and converted into a useable fuel. In its natural form, uranium is 
approximately 99.3 percent U-238 and 0.7 percent U-235. U-235 is the sought after 
isotope of uranium because it easily fissions, whereas U-238 has only a small probability 
of fission if it absorbs an additional neutron. After it is mined, uranium is milled or 
separated from the ore to make yellowcake. The yellowcake is converted into uranium 
hexafluoride gas, UF6, which is suitable for enrichment and necessary for both reactor 
fuel and weapons. Enrichment concentrates the level of U-235. While nuclear reactors 
require low enriched uranium (LEU) situated between 0.7 percent and 20 percent, nuclear 
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weapons require highly enriched uranium HEU in excess of 90 percent U-235. 
Enrichment is conducted by gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, or laser separation.35 
While all methods of enrichment separate U-238 and U-235, gas centrifuge is 
more efficient than gaseous diffusion and more common than laser separation.36 In the 
gas centrifuge method, UF6 is spun at high speeds to separate uranium isotopes. While a 
single unit makes small increases in the concentration of U-235, cascading or connecting 
units enhance the concentration of U-235 by continually extracting higher levels of the 
enriched uranium. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) explains that cascades dedicated to 
LEU production differ from cascades oriented towards HEU, in that the LEU will have 
fewer levels of enrichment. Although this appears to be cut and dry, the facility that 
houses the cascades can be designed to offer the option of converting LEU to HEU 
connections37 Furthermore, NTI explains that “batch recycling” can be used, in which 
LEU connections remain constant while enriched uranium is continually fed through the 
system. Although this method is less efficient than an HEU dedicated cascade, weapons 
grade enrichment is still possible.38 
The other pathway to nuclear energy and weapons is the use of plutonium. 
Although traces of plutonium exist in nature, the vast majority of it must be produced, 
and Pu-239 is the most fissile plutonium isotope. When uranium is used in light water 
reactors and releases neutrons, U-238 atoms absorb neutrons and makes U-239, which 
then decays to form Pu-239.39 An advantage of spent nuclear fuel is that it can be 
reprocessed in order to extract plutonium and uranium, which can be used separately or 
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combined to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The recycling and reuse of fuel contributes 
to a state’s energy security and cuts down on nuclear waste.40 
Plutonium can also be used in weapons in which higher concentrations of Pu-239 
are preferred (reactor grade plutonium can be used in weapons). To achieve weapons 
grade plutonium that is roughly 94 percent Pu-239 a special reactor is used. Whereas 
plutonium produced in a light water reactor remains in the reactor for approximately 
three years, which allows additional neutrons to be absorbed and higher than Pu-239 
isotopes to develop, the special reactors produce Pu-239 by burning uranium for a short 
period of time, often two to three months.41 Furthermore, plutonium can be produced in a 
breeder reactor, which produces more plutonium then it consumes. Thus creating 
stockpiles from which the nuclear material could be diverted to a weapon. 
In addition to creating power and making nuclear weapons, these two elements 
have further uses. Used in many applications for space exploration, plutonium acts as a 
power and heat source for space shuttles, satellites, and planetary rovers. Plutonium was 
also used to power heart pacemakers.42 Similarly, uranium is used in inertial navigation 
systems, aircraft control surfaces, and armor plating. Uranium was also used in more 
pedestrian matters such as staining glass, coloring ceramics, and developing 
photographs.43 An additional use of uranium, which presents a proliferation concern, is 
its use in naval propulsion. 
Currently, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and India, a 
non-member state to the NPT, are the only countries with nuclear powered naval vessels, 
which include ships or submarines. Although India recently introduced a nuclear 
submarine, and Brazil aspires to develop the same, serious concern developed when Iran 
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announced, in 2012, that it too desired a nuclear sub. Although these types of submarines 
enhance tactical and strategic military advantage, their proliferation concern stems from a 
loophole within the NPT that does not forbid states from generating HEU for naval 
propulsion.44 
Until recently, naval propulsion reactors received little attention in regards to 
proliferation concerns because high costs, cheaper and safer alternatives, and limited 
resources constrained the possession of nuclear powered naval vessels to the nuclear 
weapon states. The major concerns include uranium enrichment under the guise of naval 
propulsion. This could be intended for other military uses and the possible exportation of 
this technology to non-weapon states and non-NPT signatories. Without banning naval 
propulsion reactors, NPT safeguards do not apply to either the equipment or fuel during 
its “non-explosive military use.”45 
Although dual-use materials and nuclear powered submarines legally provide 
states elements of nuclear weapons, it does not dictate that a state will pursue such 
devices. First, to go from energy production to arms production is difficult. Second, there 
are perceived advantages and disadvantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, and third, a 
decision has to be made to develop a weapons program. Although dual-use materials such 
as plutonium, uranium, centrifuges, and reprocessing plants are used in civilian nuclear 
programs, additional equipment, testing, and procedures are required for weapons 
construction. Some of these include the research and development of plutonium and 
uranium metallurgy; development of chemical and high explosive programs; the use of 
special high speed cameras or pulsed x-ray generators to conduct and analyze 
hydrodynamic testing; the presence or use of thousands of pounds of natural uranium and 
tungsten, or hundreds of pounds of beryllium, which are used to reflect neutrons and 
tamp the nuclear explosion; criticality tests to understand weapon fabrication; the use of 
neutron generators and associate electronics to measure effectiveness; the use of  
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computational physics models that use special coding and computing systems; the 
training of personnel in diversified areas of physics, chemistry, and engineering; and the 
research and development of a delivery vehicle.46 
B. INTENTIONS 
Prior to establishing a civilian nuclear program or a nuclear weapons program, the 
political will or intent to pursue such an endeavor will presage development. Decision 
makers must weigh their options carefully and determine, based on their perceptions, how 
the advantages and disadvantages of becoming a nuclear power or remaining weapons 
free will affect their individual political lives or state’s future. Reasons to pursue a 
civilian nuclear program revolve around development, scientific achievement, 
international prestige and recognition, economic and energy independence, and climate 
concerns. 
Classical realists argue that the primary motivators for acquiring or refraining 
from nuclear weapons are based on the likelihood of advancing a nation’s power and 
security. Although security concerns and other external factors remain important, Tanya 
Oglivie-White argues that the realist perspective tends to discount internal pressures. She 
states that realist theories “overlook the point that states have multiple goals, both 
domestic and international, and that these goals are interlinked.”47 Japan, Brazil, and Iran 
all desire security and regional if not global influence, but nuclear weapons may not be in 
their best interest to acquire these pursuits. Although nuclear weapons would give each a 
perceived sense of security, nuclear armament could also bring multilateral pressure, 
sanctions, and isolation, which could disrupt their other desires of global inclusion and 
international respect. To be accepted as a legitimate member of the international 
community, non-nuclear weapon states, like nuclear weapon states, are expected to abide 
                                                 
46 Richard R. Paternoster, Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and Observables (Los Alamos, 
NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1992), 10–20, http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/ 
la-12430-ms.pdf; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (OTA-BP-ISC-115) (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 120–22, 
190–95. 
47 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?: An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996), 48, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/ 
ogilvi41.pdf. 
 17 
by regulations set forth by other signed and agreed to treaties such as the NPT. 
Furthermore, Solingen explains that the questionable utility of nuclear weapons, 
requirements for industrialization, involvement in the international economy, and the 
reduction of Cold War patron/client relations opened discussions between opposing 
contingents in terms of domestic and foreign policy.48 
Rather than pursuing nuclear weapons, a threshold posture could serve state 
interests not only in areas of energy dependence and prestige, but also security matters. 
Michel Fortmann relates the relationship between Brazil and Argentina, in which nuclear 
cooperation led not only to development and esteem, but also an assurance of restraint 
underlined by a notion of seriousness.49 Similarly, Quester suggests that the threshold 
offers the possibility of deterrence and a decisive advantage, but that crossing the line 
could spur preemptive military action and political isolation. He describes that a general 
understanding exists, which indicates that if a nation pursues nuclear weapons, its 
ambitions will be responded to.50 Furthermore, remaining at the threshold could also be 
used as a bargaining chip to achieve national goals, or at least create a negotiation 
environment in which the threshold state enters with a perceived advantage. 
Although there is benefit to remaining at the threshold, the ambiguity of the 
position could create confusion, hinder international relations, and cause instability. 
Misunderstanding intentions and capabilities, outside nations may perceive threshold 
states as deviant actors seeking to proliferate. While the threshold state seeks 
independence and authority in the international community, it may receive negative 
attention in the form of sanctions or military action and be viewed as untrustworthy. In 
the end, a threshold status could bring the same negative reactions as introducing nuclear 
weapons. 
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III. JAPAN  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As a nuclear threshold state, Japan provides a potential model for all non-nuclear 
weapon states. During World War II, it initiated a weapons program, but has since 
renounced weapons production or possession. Currently, Japan maintains a top-of-the-
line civilian nuclear program that includes enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 
Japan possesses few energy resources. Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, it relied on 
nuclear energy to generate 30 percent of its electricity.51 Due to its reliance on foreigners 
for uranium, it justifies its reprocessing capability by citing concerns over resource and 
energy security.52 Furthermore, Japan is a leader of international nonproliferation efforts, 
and although it has neighbors with nuclear weapons, it remains committed to its Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan demonstrates to Iran and other non-nuclear weapons states 
with major security concerns the possibility to remain within the confines of the NPT and 
simultaneously stockpile nuclear material, knowledge, and technology nearly sufficient 
for nuclear weapons. 
B. HISTORY  
As the only nation to have nuclear weapons used against it, Japan maintains an 
aversion to nuclear weapons. But this was not always the case. During World War II, 
Japan researched and developed a nuclear weapons program that manufactured nuclear 
components at different locations throughout the country. Initially envisioned as an 




                                                 




forces.53 Japanese interest in nuclear weapons began in 1940 when the country’s leading 
physicist, Yoshio Nishina presented the idea to the military and began to research 
uranium’s fissile qualities.54 
While the Army and Navy separately investigated nuclear weapons, Japan’s top 
scientists discussed the probability of constructing a weapon. In March 1943, they 
determined that a bomb was not feasible during WWII for either the Japanese or the 
Americans.55 Although post-war comments suggest that many scientists were against 
construction, the program continued. Throughout the remainder of the war, the Army 
focused on nuclear weapons, while the Navy, which initially expressed interest in nuclear 
propulsion, was ordered to research weapons after Japan’s defeat at Midway. Concerned 
over Japan’s lack of petroleum resources and an understanding that the United States 
already researched nuclear propulsion, Japanese naval leaders reported that Japan would 
be “well advised to do the same.”56 Despite this plea, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, 
Commander of the Combined Fleet, forced the navy to research the feasibility of nuclear 
weapons production.57 
Despite great sacrifice and effort, resources and coordination between the military 
branches were scarce. While the Army and Navy pursued separate programs, scientists 
with uranium enrichment expertise were unavailable due to university affiliation or 
exclusion from the program.58 Rather than calling on those with experience, Nishina 
requested Masa Takeuchi, who became responsible for the U-235 separation program. 
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Despite being an accomplished chemist, Takeuchi had never worked in this area before.59 
Furthermore, competition between the services was intense, and despite the occasional 
collaboration, it was difficult to determine how much duplication of effort occurred.60 
In order to separate U-235 from U-238, Japanese scientists, like Americans who 
completed the task earlier, discussed the option of converting their cyclotrons into mass 
spectrographs. Japanese officials discarded this idea because their single functioning 
cyclotron conducted experiments geared toward nuclear energy. Concluding that 
centrifuge and gaseous diffusion separation methods would need large facilities, Nishina 
and others finally settled on thermal diffusion. This method not only required a simpler 
design, but was developed in Germany, which presented Japan the opportunity to acquire 
equipment and expertise.61 
By 1943, Premier Hideki Tojo ordered the military to increase its efforts. In 
addition to Nishina’s program being designated as NI, it received an additional 200,000 
yen than the year before.62 After many experiments and configurations, Nishina’s group 
assembled a functioning separator in March 1944. Before the Army could benefit from 
any substantial gains, the facility containing the separators came under U.S. attack and 
was destroyed in April 1945. 
Similar to the Army, the Navy viewed each defeat in battle as an increased 
necessity for a new and decisive weapon. The Navy allocated additional funds for the 
program and designated it as F-go. Rather than using thermal diffusion like the Army, the 
Navy decided to use ultracentrifuges. Furthermore, as the war continued, the Navy’s 
ability to gather resources throughout the empire dramatically decreased. The lack of 
resources and the threat of direct attacks against Japan proper forced the Army and Navy 
to cooperate and for the Japanese to seek new sources of uranium. Their search led them 
to Korea, which had known deposits of uranium and other elements.63 
59 Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War, 91.
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Although the Japanese atomic program continued, it never proceeded much 
further than the separation stage. Even after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
interest remained in nuclear weapons and Nishina was asked if it was still possible to 
build a device.64 Although his answer remains a mystery, the desperate situation Japan 
faced during the final stages of WWII, coupled with the military and scientific 
collaboration toward nuclear weapons suggests that if Japan produced a weapon, it would 
have most likely used it.65 
C. POST-WAR 
Despite its pursuit during the war, Japan’s post-war rebuilding and public opinion 
focused its attention away from nuclear weapons. First, the United States occupied Japan 
after WWII and developed a constitution that forbade Japan from maintaining any 
offensive or war-making capabilities. Although typically considered offensive, nuclear 
weapons were not mentioned in the constitution. This omission has left the constitution 
open to interpretation and debate.66 
Although it has opened slightly in recent years, public debate in the aftermath of 
WWII was quieted by both the Japanese public and the United States, as neither wanted 
Japan to gain an independent nuclear capability. The small amount of discussion of 
nuclear weapons that existed took place behind closed doors. While Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi publically commented in 1957, that the constitution did not specifically 
deny Japan nuclear weapons, the protestation that followed forced him and his cabinet to 
resign.67 In addition, the 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact and the 1960 Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security signed with the United States stipulated that both 
countries would come to the assistance of the other in terms of defending common 
64 Shapley, “Nuclear Weapons History,” 154.
65 Ibid., 157; Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War, 242.
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67 Ibid., 220–21.
 23 
interests. Furthermore, in return for its extended deterrence services, Japan granted the 
United States basing rights, but forbade nuclear weapons and even nuclear-powered 
ships.68 
D. THE OPTION  
In the years following WWII, Japan’s nonproliferation commitment has been 
challenged. Upon President Eisenhower’s encouragement to prepare for nuclear war, 
Japan studied protection measures and U.S. battlefield nuclear doctrine. In 1955, Prime 
Minister Ichiro Hatoyama explained that U.S. nukes in Japan were justified because their 
presence preserved peace. Furthermore, Hatoyama’s successor, Shinsuke Kishi 
acknowledged that Japan’s constitution did not forbid defensive nuclear weapons. 
Throughout the 1950s, high ranking officials occasionally voiced support for weapons 
and future applications, but the nuclear allergy intensified due to the Daigo Fukuryumaru 
(Lucky Dragon) incident in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands in 1954. This involved a 
Japanese fishing crew that was exposed to radiation from U.S. nuclear tests.69 
In 1964, Eisaku Sato, known to be interested in nuclear weapons, was Japan’s 
prime minister when China tested its first nuclear device. This event spurred some 
politicians, including the powerful and popular Yasuhiro Nakasone and Shintaro Ishihara 
to question Japan’s aversion to nuclear weapons.70 Furthermore, Japan feared that 
increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam would detract from its own security concerns, 
especially on the heels of China’s test and the possibility of China holding Japan as a 
“nuclear hostage.”71 During a private meeting between Sato and U.S. president Lyndon 
Johnson, the prime minister suggested that if the Chinese got a bomb, Japan should also  
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have one.72 While leaders privately justified it as a defensive weapon and within the 
confines of the constitution, their argument was limited due to fear of international 
reaction, instability, and outbreak of war.73 
Sato had to balance his desire for nuclear weapons with the desires of his 
population and those of the United States. As a campaign promise, Sato pledged to 
receive Okinawa back from the United States, which occurred in 1972. Although U.S. 
occupation of the island offered protection in the form of nuclear weapons stationed 
there, which Sato liked, the public would not accept Japanese accommodation of the 
weapons after the island’s return. The 1,300 weapons stationed there were returned to the 
United States in June 1972.74 Fearful of Sato’s discussion about nuclear weapons, the 
Johnson administration began pushing Japan to sign the NPT. In an effort to appease both 
sides, Sato promoted U.S. policies during the Vietnam War, secretly hosted U.S. nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers and announced in 1967 and 1968, Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles” and “Four Nuclear Policies.” Although not law, the principles hold that Japan 
will not manufacture, possess, or allow nuclear weapons into Japan. The four policies 
commit Japan to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, efforts toward global disarmament, 
reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, and support for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
as long as national security is assured.75 
Although Sato publically denounced nuclear weapons, he secretly ordered the 
“Study Group on Democracy” to investigate if building a nuclear weapons capability was 
in Japan’s best interest. The study’s conclusion in the 1968/70 internal report explained 
that technically and economically such a project could be conceived, but political and 
security concerns limited the weapon’s acceptability. The study highlighted that the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella sufficiently guaranteed Japan’s security, while developing an 
indigenous program, especially a small one, would make the nation more vulnerable with 
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Japan’s population density representing a defenseless target.76 The study also suggested 
that nuclear weapons would isolate Japan from allies and the rest of the world, two 
elements that it relied on for security and economic prosperity. Finally, the report averred 
that the benefits from such an endeavor would be less reliance on the United States, 
avoidance of entanglement with U.S. interests, and national pride.77 
An additional study in the late 1960s by the Research Commission on National 
Security suggested that plutonium weapons could be produced at a rate of 20 per year and 
most effectively delivered by submarine. Research conducted in 1969 by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs concluded that although Japan should maintain its nuclear abstinence, it 
would behoove itself to achieve a latent capability. This was intended to give Japan the 
option to produce weapons relatively quick and also a reminder to the United States of its 
potential. Furthermore, it suggested that Japan should educate its population that nuclear 
policy is based on developments in the international environment. Defense Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone initiated an additional study in 1970, which provided similar analysis 
to prior reports.78 
Additional threats to Japanese security in the early 1990s surfaced when U.S. 
intelligence revealed that North Korea had developed a secret nuclear weapons program 
and that China continued to improve its arsenal. This took place in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War and during tense periods between China and Taiwan, and Pakistan and India.79 
In addition to a North Korean threat of a weapons program and its insistence of 
withdrawing from the NPT, the push for indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 
provoked additional debate and research.80 Despite concerns over an extension’s effect of 
denying Japan weapons forever and the inevitable lack of effort towards disarmament, 
the new government accepted the extension. This stance was confirmed by a Japanese 
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Defense Agency study, which declared that nuclear weapons would destroy the balance 
of power in the region, cause an arms race, destroy the nonproliferation regime, and 
negatively affect the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The study also averred that such a program 
would portray Japan as distrustful and cost too much.81 
In 1998, Japan’s non-proliferation resolve was challenged again when India and 
Pakistan both conducted successful nuclear tests. The perceived casual response from the 
international community frightened Japan as it expected NPT violators to be severely 
punished.82 Later that year, North Korea launched a Taepo-Dong missile over Japan. This 
threat sparked discussion of remilitarization, nuclear weapons, and pre-emptive strikes on 
North Korea. Despite the public’s continued aversion to nuclear weapons, events such as 
these give conservative arguments more credence. Although Vice Defense Minister 
Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign after he stated in 1999 that Japan would benefit 
from nuclear weapons, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe explained that 
weapons would not violate the constitution.83 
The year 2002 represented another year in which North Korea challenged Japan’s 
nonproliferation stance. It was confirmed that North Korea maintained a secret 
enrichment program, abducted Japanese citizens, and stated that “arms” more effectively 
dealt with Japan than “words.”84 After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, Japan 
revealed the results of another secret study, “On the Possibility of Developing Nuclear 
Weapons Domestically,” which supported the conclusions of earlier studies.85 Although 
these studies reaffirm Japan’s nonproliferation commitments, each one represents a sector 
of government that remains open to nuclear weapons. Maria Rost Rublee suggests that 
although some, particularly in the Liberal Democratic Party, favor nuclear weapons, the 
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point of their raising the issue was directed less at an actual program, and aimed more at 
publicizing the debate and testing the population’s tolerance for nuclear discussion.86 
E. CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER 
Japan began its nuclear energy program in 1954 when it allocated funds for 
nuclear research and development. In 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Law was passed, 
which created the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission and other organizations to 
pursue peaceful nuclear energy. The Japan Power Demonstration Reactor was the 
country’s first power producing reactor and ran from 1963 to 1976. Japan imported its 
first commercial reactor from the United Kingdom and began operations in 1966. In 
1955, the United States and Japan signed the Agreement for Cooperation Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning 
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which allowed for the exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment, including enriched uranium and reactors.87 
U.S. companies such as General Electric and Westinghouse partnered with 
Japanese companies to provide the island country with not only nuclear reactors and 
equipment, but also the training and expertise that allowed Japan to construct its own. 
While Japan was a key importer of U.S. nuclear technology and material during the 
1960s, 70s, and 80s, it purchased more than 60 percent of all U.S. nuclear exports during 
the 14 years from 1994 to 2008. In 2009, Japan imported more than $300 million worth 
of U.S. enriched uranium.88 
Since 1970, Japan brought 54 reactors into operation and continues, despite 
setbacks, to develop plans for its fast breeder reactor program. Before shutting down its 
reactors due to the Fukushima disaster, Japan relied on nuclear power to produce 
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approximately 30 percent of its electricity.89 Furthermore, Japan imports more than 80 
percent of its energy resources, making nuclear self-sufficiency a priority.90 In April 
2014, Kazuo Ishikawa, former Trade Ministry official stated “Japan must continue to 
work on the nuclear fuel cycle. Japan’s energy security depends on it.”91 
Although Japan imports all of it natural uranium and most of its enriched uranium 
from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, Canada, and Australia, it has 
developed a substantial front end fuel cycle. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. operates a 
commercial enrichment plant at Rokkasho with another plant being planned by Toshiba 
and the Russian nuclear corporation Rosatom. Fuel fabrication is accomplished at three 
facilities operated by Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd. and Japan’s Nuclear Fuel 
Industries. The three facilities are capable of fabricating a combined 900 tons of uranium 
fuel per year.92 
In order to make the most of its imported uranium, Japan has invested heavily in 
the back end of its fuel cycle to reprocess spent fuel and extract the unused uranium and 
plutonium. While Japan relied on British and French companies to reprocess more than 
7,000 tons of spent fuel, the Tokai reprocessing facility has been in operation since 1977 
and is capable of reprocessing spent fuel into 40 tons of MOX per year. In addition, the 
Rokkasho nuclear facility has the capacity of reprocessing 800 tons of spent fuel per year, 
but has yet to operate at full capacity and is under full IAEA safeguards.93 The 
importance of reprocessing is that plutonium in spent fuel is not weapons-usable, but 
after it is separated out through reprocessing it is possible to use in nuclear weapons.94 
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Japan has also invested heavily into its fast breeder reactor program, but due to 
construction delays and continuous problems, it has sidelined breeder reactors as the 
mainstay to its nuclear energy security. Proclaimed to guarantee Japan nuclear energy 
security, fast reactors have been the center of Japan nuclear energy policy since the 1950s 
and were expected to be the primary reactors in Japan by 2050. Japan’s first fast reactor, 
Joyo operated approximately 30 percent of the time from 1977 to 2007. Japan’s other fast 
reactor Monju has operated for approximately two years since 1994 and is currently 
offline due to mechanical failures that included a sodium leak in 1995 and additional 
faulty reactor components in 2010.95 
Although the fast reactor program maintains a reduced status, Japan’s capabilities 
and accumulation of plutonium concern nonproliferation advocates. Currently, Japan 
possesses approximately 45 tons of civil plutonium, of which 10 tons are stored in Japan. 
Frank N. von Hippel and Masafumi Takubo explain that although Japan’s plutonium 
stockpile is reactor-grade, it can be used to make more than 1,000 nuclear explosives.96 
Furthermore, after the Fukushima disaster, Japan shut down its reactors, but 
continues work on the Rakkasho reprocessing. According to Steven Fetter, the former 
Assistant Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the 
continuation of such a facility, without plans to put forth its product for energy uses, has 
led many to believe that Japan seeks a latent deterrent. Fetter also suggests that this 
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Despite these concerns and mounting costs of the reprocessing program, in which the 
Rakkasho facility has accrued a $22 billion bill, Japan remains committed to closing the 
fuel cycle and securing energy independence.98 
Although Japan stockpiles plutonium, Japanese nuclear policy expert Katsuhisa 
Furukawa explains that not only is the plutonium under IAEA safeguards, but that it 
would likely take between three to five years to produce a device. He attributes this to 
Japan’s limited domestic stock of uranium, its vulnerability to nuclear fuel embargoes, its 
pacifist society, its lack of experience and nuclear doctrine, and the absence of a 
command and control, intelligence, and operation security systems.99 
An additional aspect of Japan’s civilian nuclear program that gives credence to 
the country’s innovation is its past interest in nuclear propulsion. Prior to and during 
WWII, Japan’s naval officials grew concerned over its oil reserves and researched the 
utility of nuclear powered vessels. Although the war limited the military program, a 
nuclear powered merchant ship, Mutsu, was put into service in 1970.100 Believed by 
many Japanese officials to be the first in a fleet of nuclear powered merchant ships, 
Mutsu suffered technical and political problems. 
Its first sea trail was delayed due to the local fishing industry’s concern of 
radioactive contamination. Only after Japanese officials agreed to tow the ship to the 
open ocean was the Mutsu released from her berth in 1974.101 When the ship’s reactor 
achieved criticality a safety alarm alerted the crew that a radiation leak was present and 
the reactor was subsequently shutdown. Another controversy developed when fishermen 
blocked the Mutsu’s return to the port of Mutsu for 45 days.102 After its return, Mutsu’s  
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reactor underwent extensive overhaul and was retested in 1991. After four successful sea 
trials, the Japanese gained experience in design, construction, and operation of nuclear 
vessels.103 One year later, the ship was decommissioned. 
While Mutsu experienced technical and political difficulties, Japan continued its 
marine reactor research and development. In 1996 and 1997, Japan produced safer and 
more reliable prototype reactors known as the Marine Reactor X and Deep-Sea Reactor 
X.104 Japan does not currently have a nuclear powered ship, but the two reactors were 
developed for future use.  
The continuation of this program demonstrates Japan’s pursuit of alternate fuel 
sources for its commercial vessels. Although not intended to be devious, marine nuclear 
propulsion provides an additional avenue to weapons-grade material. Although Mutsu 
used LEU of four percent,105 the NPT does not limit enrichment levels of naval 
propulsion reactors.106 
F. NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS 
In addition to bilateral pacts with the United States, Japan made other moves to 
solidify its commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament. On December 19, 1955, the 
Diet adopted Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law, which states that Japan would only seek 
peaceful nuclear pursuits. Furthermore, Japan joined the IAEA in 1957. Comfortable with 
his country’s security environment, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda focused national efforts 
to revitalize Japan’s economy and make it a world leader by the end of the 1960s.107 
While the Lyndon Johnson administration pressured Japan to sign the NPT in 
1968, Japan’s leaders debated the treaty’s advantages. Although deliberations were tense, 
both sides agreed that the NPT unfairly treated non-weapon states by banning them from 
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ever acquiring nuclear weapons, while it did too little to address nuclear weapons states’ 
commitments to disarmament. Furthermore, Japan’s Foreign Ministry conducted a policy 
study. This study claimed that if Japan signed the NPT it should keep the economic and 
technical ability to develop weapons, for the future might necessitate their availability. 
Although Japan signed the NPT in 1970, it took until 1976 to ratify the treaty on the 
preconditions that West Germany would sign and ratify, and a U.S. guarantee that it 
would not interfere with Japan’s civilian reprocessing activities.108 The debate 
surrounding ratification was intense because Japan viewed the treaty as a “commitment 
they would unlikely break,” but understood that any further delay could cause greater 
suspicion from the international community and damage U.S.-Japan relations.109 
Japan is also a member of many organizations such as the United Nations, the 
Conference on Disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission. In addition to the NPT, Japan is a state 
party to other nuclear treaties and agreements such as Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Joint Spent Fuel Convention, 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Zangger Committee, Nuclear 
Supplier Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar 
Arrangement, and has signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement and placed in force the 
Additional Protocol.110 Japan also works with the IAEA and other multilateral efforts 
toward future fuel cycle technologies such as Generation IV Nuclear Reactors (Gen IV), 
International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), and the 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which researches and develops future 
nuclear technologies with the highest standards for safety, security, and 
nonproliferation.111 
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G. KEEPING THE OPTION OPEN 
Although public discussion over nuclear weapons has somewhat opened, Japan’s 
population remains largely anti-nuclear. Being the case, the government is unlikely to go 
against its citizens’ desires, but views that having the option available is important. 
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi explained that although Japan does not have 
nuclear weapons, it is possible to get them. Furthermore, in 2003, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fakuda reiterated Koizumi’s sentiment, and Shinzo Abe added that 
nuclear weapons are permitted if they are defensive. All three agreed that although 
keeping the option open is important for Japan’s future leaders, the country does not 
intend on a weapons capability for the distant future.112 Furthermore, Kyoto University 
Professor Terumasa Nakanishi argued that Japan should attain an infrastructure that 
would allow the country to quickly build nuclear weapons. He described three situations 
in which Japan might need nuclear weapons. These include a deterioration of the U.S. 
commitment; China attaining a naval capability that allows it to maintain a permanent 
presence in the vicinity of Japan; and the international community accepting North Korea 
with a nuclear arsenal.113 
H. CONCLUSION 
Although Japan’s nuclear industry has been setback by the 2011 Fukushima 
meltdown, it still maintains a robust nuclear infrastructure. Japan has advanced 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, which allow it to stockpile great amounts of 
weapons usable nuclear material. Japan has enough plutonium within its borders for more 
than 1,000 weapons.114 Japan also has the technological acumen and financial resources 
to build a weapon if so desired. These capabilities to build nuclear weapons were not 
accidents, but purposefully maintained. In 1994, a Japanese newspaper, Mainichi 
Shimbun, reported that a top secret document, “Our Nation’s Foreign Policy Principles” 
established the criterion that Japan continues its nonproliferation stance, but keep the 
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financial and technical capacity to build nuclear weapons.115 Furthermore, Japan is 
situated in a dynamic security environment, and studies suggest that it is beneficial for 










                                                 





Brazil’s nuclear history began in the 1950s and was founded on aspirations of 
prestige, power, energy independence, scientific achievement, economic prosperity, and 
global integration. Although it began and is currently under civilian control, Brazil’s 
nuclear program advanced rapidly under the tutelage of its military. It not only began a 
nuclear weapons program, which it later renounced, but also successfully enriched 
uranium and began a nuclear submarine program. Furthermore, Brazil has experienced 
setbacks from the international community, which it views as the result of the imbalance 
between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Although Brazil is a 
member, or state party, to many nuclear organizations and agreements that dedicate the 
country to nonproliferation and disarmament, it continues to have a tense relationship 
with the international nonproliferation regime. Among other elements of its nuclear 
program, Brazil stresses its need to domestically produce nuclear energy and its rights as 
a NNWS under the NPT. Although Brazil is constrained by regional and international 
commitments, its refusal to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and its pursuit of nuclear 
submarines not only questions its intentions, but allows the country to close the gap 
between its current capabilities and the nuclear weapons threshold. 
B. HISTORY 
In 1951, Brazil established the National Research Council, later renamed the 
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development to lead Brazil’s nuclear 
efforts. Similar to other nuclear aspirants, Brazil sought foreign assistance for nuclear 
know-how and material. In 1953–1954, Brazil attempted to acquire nuclear technology 
from West Germany and France, but U.S. concerns of proliferation blocked the transfer 
of ultracentrifuges from Germany, and internal political turmoil in Brazil prevented a 
deal with France. Undeterred, Brazil opted to take advantage of the U.S. Atoms for Peace 
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program and signed a deal with the United States that built a research reactor for Brazil in 
exchange for a pledge to engage only in peaceful uses.116 
Maintaining the commitment toward its “brilliant future,”117 Brazil’s military 
government, led by President Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva, decided to pursue the full 
nuclear fuel cycle. In 1971, Brazil’s National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) 
agreed with Westinghouse and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to build and supply 
the fuel for Angra 1, Brazil’s first nuclear power plant.118 In 1973, Brazil attempted to 
renew its contract with Westinghouse with the added provision that the supplier provide 
Brazil with enrichment capability. Westinghouse agreed to build more reactors, but 
refused to provide enrichment resources as Brazil was still outside the NPT.119 
Another setback to Brazil’s full cycle came shortly after India’s test of a nuclear 
device in 1974. Concerned over proliferation, the United States strengthened its control 
over exporting nuclear technology. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) required 
countries to purchase enriched uranium by certain dates. This new requirement caused an 
“inflated demand” that the AEC was unsure it could fulfill.120 To solve this problem, the 
AEC limited the supply and turned permanent contracts into conditional ones. For Brazil, 
this meant that its fuel supply and Westinghouse contract were in jeopardy. From this, 
Brazil realized the importance of a domestic capability and no longer viewed the United 
States as a “reliable nuclear trading partner.”121 
In 1975, Brazil turned to West Germany to construct eight reactors and provide 
full nuclear fuel cycle technology. Originally covering mining, enrichment, fuel 
                                                 
116 Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, March 12, 2014), 17–18. 
117 Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, “Argentina and Brazil,” in Security with Nuclear Weapons?: 
Different Perspectives on National Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 232. 
118 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way: Negotiation and Symmetry in Brazil’s Nuclear 
Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 3 (2010), 553, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/ 
10736700.2010.517003. 
119 Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope, 18. 
120 Ibid., 19. 
121 Michael Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program of Brazil, Working Paper (Stanford, CA: Center 
for International Security and Arms Control, 1997), 14, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10340/barletta.pdf. 
 37 
fabrication, reprocessing, and power plant construction, the deal was criticized by the 
United States. This led West Germany to provide Brazil with the less efficient jet-nozzle 
method of enrichment and place all Brazilian facilities under safeguards.122 In 1978, 
under President Carter, the United States passed the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
that required nuclear safeguards on imported material and equipment. Viewing this as 
another hindrance to autonomy, Brazil’s Ministry of Mines and Energy stated, “our 
nuclear program will continue…we do not want the atomic bomb. We want to be 
independent, to construct for our future, and to prevent the effect of any future world 
petroleum and energy crisis.”123 In response to the barriers placed on its nuclear program, 
the military proposed a parallel program that promoted independence, self-sufficiency, 
and technical achievement. 
C. PARALLEL PROGRAM AND RIVALRY WITH ARGENTINA 
Officially titled the Brazilian Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology 
(PATN), Brazil’s secret military nuclear program included all three services. The Air 
Force studied laser enrichment and the Army researched graphite reactors. The Navy 
focused on both enrichment and nuclear submarines.124 Working with the Institute of 
Technological Research (IPEN), the Navy program evolved the quickest and survived the 
longest. By 1981 the Navy built two centrifuges and a cascade of nine by 1984.125 In 
1986 it had mastered the enrichment process, but to ensure the program continued to 
receive material and equipment, its success was not announced until September 1987.126 
Although a majority of the technologies were domestically produced, the parallel 
program benefited from foreign assistance. Many scientists and engineers received 
education in the United States and advanced training in West Germany, particularly in  
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areas of nuclear safety and material management. Brazil also clandestinely received 200 
kilograms of uranium hexafluoride from China and special instrumentation to construct 
ultracentrifuges from West Germany.127 
Furthermore, the program was in competition with Argentina’s own secret 
program. Similar to Brazil, Argentina initiated its nuclear program in the 1950s, relied on 
the United States and West Germany for material and expertise, and suffered similar 
setbacks due to supply controls. In the 1970s, Argentina led South America in the nuclear 
field and produced power in 1974 with plans to build a reprocessing plant and enrichment 
facility by 1978. While neither country viewed the other as a threat,128 Brazil urgently 
believed that it needed the capability to make a bomb. Not to construct and unveil a 
bomb, but to have the option of developing one. “The mere capacity to match a potential 
Argentine bomb was presumed sufficient to deter its construction.”129 This assessment 
matched a 1983 National Intelligence Estimate, which asserted that because Brazil 
refrained from signing the NPT and believed that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) 
were a right, the country at the very least sought the option.130 
Rather than starting an arms race, the neighboring countries supported each 
other’s programs. By the mid-1980s the two revealed their secret programs and began 
cooperating. Politics, economics, civilian leadership, presidential leadership, external 
suspicion, and frustration with nuclear suppliers enhanced cooperation between the two. 
This cooperation not only advanced nuclear development, but as Virginia Gamba-
Stonehouse suggests, it also advanced security and stability.131 In 1985, Argentine 
President Raul Alfonsin and Brazilian President Jose Sarney signed the Joint Declaration 
on Nuclear Policy, which declared cooperation between the two and any other Latin  
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American country seeking nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This expanded the 
Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy signed in 1980.  
While many other agreements between Brazil and Argentina were signed, the 
bilateral agency, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Material (ABACC) was formed in 1991. This entity ensured the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, informed each side on the other’s activities, and permitted access to one another’s 
military installations for verification purposes. Established before either signed the NPT, 
and viewed as less strict than the IAEA Additional Protocol, its verification methods are 
recognized by the NSG and allow Brazil and Argentina to participate in the trade of 
enrichment and reprocessing technology.132 Furthermore, the ABACC, Brazil, Argentina, 
and the IAEA formed the Quadripartite Agreement, which extended safeguards 
established in the ABACC and allowed the IAEA to conduct its own verification 
processes.133 
Although organizations and agreements such as these promote cooperation and 
understanding, tensions still arise. Argentina still fears that Brazil will seek nuclear 
weapons when political elites publically discuss the possibility of nuclear devices. In 
2009, Brazil’s Jose Alencar, then vice president and former defense minister, stated that 
nuclear weapons could provide a deterrent capability and boost international 
recognition.134 While most believe that Brazil should adhere to its constitution and 
nuclear commitments, others view India as an example of how nuclear weapons can still 
benefit a nation.135 
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Another area that causes concern not only for Argentines, but also the rest of the 
world, is Brazil’s nuclear submarine program. Even after a civilian government took over 
from the military in 1985, the Navy program continued to proceed and receive 
government support. Shutting the parallel program down, President Fernando Collor de 
Mello and his successors Itamar Franco and Fernando Cardoso cut the submarine 
program’s budget, but did not cancel it altogether.136 Despite this trend, the Cardoso 
government contracted with the Navy in 2000 to construct a uranium enrichment facility 
at Resende. Construction and testing were completed in 2004 and the first of four cascade 
modules became operational in 2005.137 In 2003, newly elected President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva supported the submarine program and for the first time, civilians rather than 
solely the military promoted the nuclear submarine program.138 
D. WHY A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE? 
When the parallel program began, Brazil’s Navy worked for an enrichment 
capability to fuel a nuclear submarine. Although regional and global circumstances have 
changed since the program’s inception, the reasoning for building a nuclear powered 
submarine has remained constant. To support the objectives of sea denial, sea control, 
and power projection, Brazil’s National Strategy of Defense explained the utility of 
nuclear submarines.139 
Since the 1960s, Brazil considered power projection to be attained through the 
“maritime security area,” which pertained to the South Atlantic, but has since expanded 
globally.140 Beginning with waters closer to home, Brazil’s priority is the protection of its 
5,000 mile coastline, the 70 percent of its population living within 200 miles of the sea, 
the large amount of economic activity that takes place on the coast, and its offshore 
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natural resources.141 Although Taylor explains that nuclear submarines are ill suited to 
protect oil platforms as they do not present a visual deterrent, like patrol craft, former 
Vice President Alencar justified nuclear submarines by explaining that Brazil needs one 
to protect and deter aggressors from encroaching on its four million miles of economic 
exclusion zone and its recently discovered oil and natural gas fields.142 
In addition, Brazil fears foreign presence in its maritime domain. The potential 
effectiveness of submarines conjures up memories of the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas War, in 
which a British sub not only sank the Argentine General Belgrano, but also marginalized 
the rest of its navy.143 The 2008 reestablishment of the U.S. Fourth Fleet concerns Brazil 
because its responsibilities include the waters surrounding South America.144 
Brazil maintains that technological development spurs industrial advancement. 
This was evident in the late 1960s when Embraer Aeronautics developed a number of 
aircraft for the military that were later converted to civilian use and subsequently 
exported. Similarly, former President Lula da Silva views the submarine project as not 
only a path to Brazilian technological achievement and independence, but also a benefit 
to the economy. The submarine program alone is expected to include 30 companies, 
employing 8,000 Brazilians, and supplying more than 36,000 parts and supplies. This 
does not include the construction of the shipyard and base for future subs.145 Like 
Embraer, Brazil plans to export nuclear sub technology.146 
Brazil also views nuclear submarines as an avenue to modernity and political 
prestige. As one of the top ten economies in the world, Brazil has no affiliation with 
nuclear weapons, but is the first NNWS to pursue a nuclear submarine. In addition, Brazil 
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is the only BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) country without a nuclear sub. To become 
a global player, Brazil believes that a nuclear submarine would make a strong case for 
such a role.147 
E. NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND THE THRESHOLD 
Nuclear submarines allow NNWS to legally approach the nuclear weapons 
threshold because the NPT makes no mention of nuclear propulsion reactors (NPR). This 
omission allows NNWS to utilize HEU, or weapons grade uranium, for its naval 
propulsion needs. While this fuel is being used in a “non-explosive” manner, it is 
withdrawn from safeguards and offers an opportunity for diversion.148 Furthermore, 
stockpiles of HEU can be claimed to be stored for this and other military purposes 
allowing states the ability to “rapidly break out of the NPT.”149 
Although the United States and United Kingdom navies reportedly use HEU in 
excess of weapons grade for their NPRs, reports indicate that Brazilian naval reactors will 
use less than 20 percent enriched uranium. While the Nuclear Threat Initiative estimates 
that Brazil will use between seven and 10 percent enriched uranium,150 Togzhan 
Kassenova explains that Brazil is likely to use 18-19 percent enriched uranium, but in 
coordination with ABACC and the IAEA, it could use uranium enriched beyond the 20 
percent mark. The importance of the 20 percent mark is that “most of the isotope 
separative work needed to reach 90 percent enrichment is done.”151 
In addition to having the legal capacity to enrich uranium beyond 90 percent and 
withdrawing the material from safeguards, Brazil contracted with the French company 
DCNS in 2008 to build its nuclear submarines, which agreed to provide training,  
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technology, and knowledge.152 Although Brazil is relatively inexperienced in nuclear 
submarine construction, over time it will gain experience and expertise to go along with 
its material production. 
Despite its ability to close the threshold within a legal framework, Brazil 
negotiates with the ABACC and the IAEA to determine sufficient verification methods. 
As the first NNWS under the NPT to develop a nuclear submarine, it is important for 
Brazil to work with the IAEA and put safeguards on its NPR fuel to not only reassure the 
world that it will be used for peaceful purposes, but also to set a precedent for future 
submarine builders.153 
F. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NPT AND IAEA 
Although Brazil renounced nuclear weapons in its 1988 constitution, signed the 
NPT in 1998, and maintains a role in nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, it 
continues to have an uneasy relationship with the international nonproliferation regime. 
In response to its past military governments and weapons program, Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution states in Article XXI that “all nuclear activity within the national territory 
shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National 
Congress.”154 
Prior to its current constitution, Brazil laid the ground work for peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. Upon its formation in 1967, Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
created a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite its 
signature, Brazil, like Argentina, did not accede to the treaty until 1994, but both abided 
by it. In 1984, Brazilian Air Force officials proposed the idea of conducting a PNE, but  
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President Figueiredo concluded that although PNEs are “available”155 to non-nuclear 
weapon states, a test would undermine the spirit of the treaty and direct undesired 
attention to Brazil’s main objective of enriching uranium.156 
To further their cooperation in economic, political, and societal matters, Brazil 
and Argentina signed nuclear deals that brought the countries closer together. In 1980, 
they signed the Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Application of the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy; in 1985, they signed the Joint Declaration on Nuclear 
Policy; in 1991 they signed the Bilateral Agreement and the Quadripartite Agreement; 
and the NPT in 1998. 
NPT ratification was not unanimously accepted throughout Brazil. Many believed 
that previous agreements such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, ABACC, and its own constitution 
sufficed to prevent Brazil from seeking nuclear weapons. Others argue that accession to 
the NPT was a move that gave Brazil “neither technological nor political gains.”157 
Brazil views the NPT as discriminatory and disproportionately favoring the 
nuclear weapon states (NWS), while limiting and burdening the NNWS. From Brazil’s 
perspective, the treaty suggests that the NWS will protect the NNWS from nuclear attack, 
“which went against a fundamental need of each country to be able to defend itself.”158 In 
addition, the treaty was largely created by the NWS with too little consultation from the 
NNWS. This led to the belief that NWS placed NNWS in a “permanent condition of 
technological disadvantage.”159 
Furthermore, Brazil often cites the disparity between efforts toward 
nonproliferation and a lack of NWS commitment to disarmament. As a leader of 
international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, Brazil actively participates within 
the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which focuses global attention toward NWS 
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responsibilities of disarmament. During the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Brazil and 
the NAC established the 13 Practical Steps toward global disarmament.160 Brazil argues 
that nonproliferation and disarmament are interdependent and that NNWS will not feel 
the need to develop their own weapons capabilities if they are assured that NWS are not 
developing new weapons or systems.161 While Brazil argues that the NWS remain 
noncommittal to their NPT Article VI obligations, it views measures such as the IAEA’s 
Additional Protocol as another example of the nuclear haves dictating rights of the 
nuclear have-nots. 
Brazil’s contention with the IAEA’s Additional Protocol is similar to that of the 
NPT. The Additional Protocol allows the IAEA greater access to both declared and 
undeclared nuclear information, equipment, material, and facilities. Specifically, it grants 
full access to a state’s nuclear fuel cycle and allows for short notice access, as little as 
two hours, to facilities. Furthermore, the protocol is ambiguous about its inspections, 
particularly its ability to inspect mines, enrichment facilities, waste sites, “as well as to 
any other location where nuclear material is or may be present.”162 
Presently, Brazil will not sign the Additional Protocol because it refuses to take 
on additional responsibility until the NWS make meaningful efforts toward disarmament. 
Brazil views it as insulting to its nonproliferation efforts and national pride. Brazilian 
officials claim that the IAEA neglects to consider Brazil’s renouncement of nuclear 
weapons and the steps it has taken towards nonproliferation,163 and that Brazil “does not 
want its autonomy curtailed even further.”164 Officials also argue that the protocol creates 
additional financial costs to developing countries because of further regulations and  
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believe that these countries should not have to dedicate funds to internationally mandated 
requirements. Moreover, Brazil believes that increased access will make its technology 
vulnerable to industrial espionage.165 
Although Brazil is concerned about protecting the secrecy of its submarine 
program’s location and technology,166 a recent example of Brazil’s concern over 
protecting its centrifuges took place in 2004, when it denied the IAEA from conducting 
full inspections on its enrichment capabilities at the Resende enrichment facility. Panels 
placed in front of the centrifuges and casings obstructed IAEA access. This not only 
raised doubts about the intentions of its nuclear program, but also set a precedent for 
others who wished to “blackout” some of their nuclear equipment.167 According to Maria 
Rost Rublee, Brazil denied access not to hide unlawful activity, but to establish limits on 
investigations and to protect proprietary technology that Brazil claims is 25 percent more 
efficient than centrifuges used by other nations. Despite the friction, the two sides 
negotiated a deal, which allowed Brazil to keep the panels in place, but at a reduced 
size.168 
G. CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
Brazil has an abundance of uranium resources, which it uses for domestic use and 
international trade. Since 1982, Brazil has mined uranium from three mines, which hold 
five percent of the world’s uranium deposits, but presently mines exclusively from Lagoa 
Real at a rate of 340 tons per year.169 Additionally, Brazil enriches uranium at its Nuclear 
Fuel Factory at Resende to 3.5-4.0 percent for use in the Angra 1 and Angra 2 power 
plants and plans to continue enrichment for the Angra 3 reactor, which has been under 
construction since the 1980’s.170 Although Brazil has an enrichment capability, it 
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continues to rely on Canada and URENCO for a portion of its industrial scale 
enrichment.171 Furthermore, Brazil had a small scale reprocessing program, but 
dismantled the facility in the early 2000s.172 
In addition to Brazil’s resources and capabilities to enrich uranium, 
nonproliferation advocates remain concerned because Brazil’s civilian nuclear industry 
works closely with its navy. The Brazilian Navy owns the centrifuges and leases them to 
Brazilian Nuclear Industries (INB), which runs the Resende facility. Moreover, it 
enriches uranium at the Aramar Experimental Center for use in its nuclear submarine 
program.173 Brazil’s civilian nuclear industry justifies its reliance on the military branch 
and promotes further nuclear usage by citing the country’s over-reliance on 
hydroelectricity, its vulnerability to climate change, and its subjection to fluctuations in 
oil and gas prices.174 
H. CONCLUSION 
From its initial interest in nuclear power, Brazil believes it has been subjugated 
into an inferior position in nuclear matters in relation to the nuclear weapon states. This 
feeling has resonated throughout its nuclear history. While efforts to advance its program 
have been met by obstacles and oversight of the international community, Brazil 
advanced its nuclear capability through its parallel program. Although it has since 
renounced nuclear weapons and has remained faithful to its NPT commitment, Brazil 
demonstrates its urge for nuclear independence and like Iran fights for non-weapon 
states’ nuclear rights. Brazil refuses to sign the Additional Protocol because it views the 
agreement as an enhancement to the discriminatory nature of the NPT. Although 
rectifying its differences with the IAEA in 2004, Brazil raised eyebrows when it impeded 
full IAEA inspection of its centrifuges. Finally, the Brazilian Navy’s involvement with its  
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civilian nuclear industry and its nuclear submarine program not only raises suspicion of 
its intentions, but also allows it to advance its program towards the nuclear weapons 




Envisioned to propel Iran’s global image, its nuclear program initially focused on 
energy production and the nuclear fuel cycle. Over the course of time, a revolution, the 
Iran-Iraq War, U.S. presence in the region, tension with neighbors, condemnation from 
the international community, and dynamic politics, shaped Iran’s nuclear perceptions. 
Although Iranian leaders swear its program is for peaceful purposes, its actions lead 
many to believe that the country seeks nuclear weapons. 
Iran has built a substantial nuclear infrastructure, which includes mining, milling, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrications facilities. Although the country studies plutonium 
separation and has experimented with equipment often used in nuclear weapons, it 
maintains the ability to enrich uranium to levels suitable for reactors or weapons. Under 
the current deal with the P5+1, Iran has suspended its 20 percent uranium enrichment, but 
unless the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is extended a more definitive agreement is 
established before July 20, 2014, Iran could resume its enrichment to higher levels. 
Although the JPA intends to increase Iran’s breakout time, estimates conclude that Iran 
could still manufacture enough fissile material within five months.175 
Iran’s relation with the IAEA is at times cooperative and other times 
uncooperative. Despite who is president, the Supreme Leader makes all the important 
decisions and is influenced by a diverse set of political elements. Although Iranian 
intentions remain unclear, its nuclear program has historically faced periods of progress 
beset by episodes of disruption. Despite this progression, Iran slowly develops its 
program and offers its leadership options for the direction of its nuclear future. 
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Iran’s nuclear history began in the 1950’s with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s 
desire to be a “third superpower” alongside the United States and the Soviet Union.176 Its 
civilian program started in 1957 under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, which supplied 
the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with a research reactor and highly enriched uranium 
to fuel the reactor.177 During the program’s initial stages, Iranians focused on energy 
production. The Shah wanted to conserve Iran’s fossil fuels for export and viewed 
nuclear power as a benefit of technology. 
Regarding the weapons side of the equation, he “wanted to keep open the option 
of developing nuclear weapons by seeking access to the full nuclear fuel cycle.”178 He 
sought uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities.179 Although Iran 
signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in July of 1968 and later 
ratified it in 1970, the United States rejected these desires over proliferation concerns. 
The shah envisioned more than 20 operational reactors producing energy. In 
1975, West Germany began construction on two units for the Bushehr power plant, 
France began preparations for two additional sites, and thousands of Iranian scientists 
received nuclear education and training in these countries as well as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and India.180 In the late1970s, Iran imported uranium yellowcake from 
South Africa and uranium dioxide from Algeria.181 If Iran had conversion and 
enrichment capabilities at the time, it could have produced weapons-grade material.182 
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By 1979, Iran had invested $3 billion for the two units. Just prior to the Islamic 
Revolution, one unit was finished while the other was half complete. The revolution 
halted further progress.183 
Professing that nuclear power contradicted the principles of Islam, Ayatollah 
Khomeini ceased further work on the Bushehr facility and forced the cancellation of 
contracts with the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. 184 
Furthermore, many nuclear-trained scientists evaded the revolution and departed the 
country.185 During the Iran-Iraq War, the Bushehr plant received heavy damage from 
Iraqi air attacks. Although many perceived that the effects of the revolution and war 
stopped all work on the nuclear program, some aspects continued. 
During the war, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) took control of 
the nuclear program and continued its progress in a different direction. The quest for 
nuclear weapons was not only an answer for Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons 
during the conflict, but also solidification of Iran’s placement as the rightful hegemon in 
the Middle East.186 Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a leader of the Islamic Republic 
Party, summoned Dr. Fereidun Feharaki, a nuclear advisor to the shah, to build a bomb as 
part of his duty to preserve the revolution.187 Moreover, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as 
president, stressed the need to make every effort to construct nuclear weapons in the 
interest of self-preservation.188 Finally, after the war in which chemical weapons killed 
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chief of the armed forces, Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that unconventional weapons “were 
very decisive,”189 and “that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when 
war reaches a serious stage.”190 
While the United States raised concerns over a possible weapons program during 
the 1980s, others offered support for Iran’s civilian program. Argentina, Spain, West 
Germany, and the Soviet Union offered assistance in the reconstruction of Bushehr, fuel 
for its research reactor, and training for its technicians.191 Iran signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Pakistan after Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan visited the country 
in 1987. Khan designed Pakistan’s first generation centrifuge, the P-1, and allegedly 
supplied Iran with blueprints of the P-1 and more advanced centrifuges192 and 
instructions for enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels.193 
Although Iran received help from various sources, its nuclear progression 
continued at a “glacial pace” until Gholam Reza Aghazadeh took over as head of the 
program in 1997.194 Five years later in 2002, the Iranian Marxist-Islamist group, 
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) revealed that Iran had been working on a uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz and a plutonium extraction plant at Arak. While these dual-use facilities 
could be used for peaceful purposes, as Iran contends, they still needed to be declared to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran argued that it did not need to inform the 
IAEA until construction was complete,195 but under its safeguards commitment it should 
have provided information to the IAEA “before nuclear material is introduced into a new 
facility.”196 In addition to concealing its facilities, Iran also experimented with laser 
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enrichment and plutonium separation, acquired nuclear material from China, and 
continued to conduct business with the AQ Khan network.197 
Pressured by the IAEA, Iran cooperated with France, Germany, and the UK, 
known as the E3, and agreed to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement the 
Additional Protocol, and cooperate with IAEA inspectors.198 Between October 2003 and 
August 2005, Iran and the E3 worked toward a long-term agreement in which the 
Europeans proposed that Iran receive nuclear fuel supplies and cooperation on security 
and economic concerns if it ceased its uranium enrichment and plutonium separation 
activities, stopped pursuing the nuclear fuel cycle and heavy water reactor, ratified the 
Additional Protocol, and agreed to never back out of the NPT.199 Offended by the 
proposal, Iran denounced all aspects of the E3 agreement and restarted its enrichment and 
uranium conversion activities.200 In response, the IAEA referred Iran to the United 
Nations Security Council in February 2006.201 
Over the next four years, the UN Security Council adopted six resolutions, which 
attempted to limit Iran’s nuclear program. Adopted on July 31, 2006, Resolution 1696 
demanded that Iran abide by past IAEA resolutions that called for increased transparency 
and enrichment suspension. Successive resolutions built on this first one, mandating that 
Iran cease work on its heavy-water reactor, adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, and 
install advanced monitoring devices. The resolutions also imposed sanctions that targeted 
the state, the economy, specific industries and companies, and individuals.202 
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Despite these sanctions, Iran continued to expand its program. One month after 
the UN adopted Resolution 1696, Ahmadinejad announced the opening of the heavy-
water plant at Arak and began construction for another enrichment facility at Fordow. 
The presence of this underground facility was revealed in 2009.203 In 2010, after failed 
attempts by the United States to convince Iran to exchange its enriched uranium for 
foreign 20 percent enriched uranium, the Natanz facility began enriching to 20 percent.204 
After Russian help on completing the reactor and providing fuel elements, Iran brought 
its first reactor online at Bushehr in May 2011. It took until 2013 for the reactor to enter 
commercial operation, but after 55 years Iran began producing nuclear energy. Although 
it has taken this long for its first functioning reactor, Iran, with Russia’s assistance plans 
to build two more at Bushehr and at least six others in the future.205 
Shortly after the success at Bushehr, President Ahmadinejad’s second term came 
to an end, and the former nuclear negotiator, moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani won the 
2013 presidential election. Focused on correcting past economic and foreign policy 
failures, Rouhani is open to diplomatically engaging the West.206 This is evident in the 
continued negotiations and the implementation of the November 20, 2013 agreement 
known as the Joint Plan of Action. Despite this cooperation, Iran adamantly defends its 
NPT rights and continues to advance its nuclear program. 
C. CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
Iran maintains mining, milling, enrichment, and fuel fabrication capabilities. 
Although Iran announced in February 2013 that it discovered additional natural uranium 
deposits,207 the World Nuclear Association suggests that Iran continues to rely on the 450 
tons of uranium it purchased from South Africa in the 1980s and its small deposits at the 
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mine in Gachin.208 Milling and fuel fabrication take place at Esfahan. In addition, the 
facility produces fuel for the heavy-water reactor at Arak.209 
In addition to Esfahan, other major facilities are located at Natanz, Fordow, and 
Arak. The Natanz Enrichment Facility complex consists of a Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant 
(PFEP), Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and a uranium conversion plant. Prior to the Joint 
Plan of Action, the PFEP, which began operations in 2003, enriched uranium up to 20 
percent for the Tehran Research Reactor. Since February 2013, approximately 1,177 kg 
of 3.5 percent LEU from the FEP had been enriched to produce roughly 150 kg of near 
20 percent U-235.210 Although the JPA forces Iran to convert half of its 20 percent 
stockpile, Iran justifies its enrichment by claiming that it will construct additional 
research reactors to replace its aging Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).211 Located 
underground, the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant began operating in 2007 and has the 
capacity to house more than 50,000 centrifuges.212 Currently, 15,420 IR-1 and 1,000 
advanced IR-2 centrifuges are installed. Approximately, 14,000 IR-1s are operational, 
while the IR-2s remain offline.213 
Also situated inside a mountain, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) 
currently contains 2,976 IR-1 centrifuges.214 Although Iran announced that the facility 
would house improved centrifuges, their installation has yet to take place. Prior to the 
JPA, Iran enriched uranium to 19.75 percent, but currently enriches to only five 
percent.215 
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Iran’s enrichment capabilities concern nonproliferation advocates because as of 
May 2014 Iran had produced a total of 11,977 kg of 3.5 percent UF6 at a rate of 233 kg 
per month.216 A portion of this was further enriched to produce approximately 450 kg of 
19.75 percent UF6.217 Not only is this amount too much for the TRR to consume, but 
when the 20 percent enrichment mark is reached, roughly 90 percent of the work toward 
weapons grade uranium (WGU) is accomplished.218 The JPA reduces Iran’s stockpile of 
20 percent UF6 by mandating that half must be diluted to no more than five percent and 
half must be converted into uranium oxide powder to be used in the TRR.219 While Iran 
has completed the dilution, the IAEA’s May 2014 report indicates that Iran still needs to 
convert 38 kg.220 
An Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) report takes these figures 
into consideration and argues that Iran would still produce a significant quantity of 
weapons grade uranium. It suggests that even with JPA constraints and UF6 conversion, 
Iran could still produce 25 kg of uranium in less than five months. ISIS calculates that 
Iran could produce 12.5 kg of WGU in three months using its stock of 3.5 percent 
enriched uranium and currently operating centrifuges. Also during these three months, 
Iran could construct a reconversion line to turn the oxide back into UF6. After this 
transformation, 3.5 and 19.75 percent enriched uranium could be further processed into 
another 12.5 kg of WGU in less than two months.221 This time could be further reduced 
if Iran’s more advanced centrifuges become operational. 
Originally intended to host a hot cell facility to separate plutonium, the Arak 
nuclear site currently contains a heavy-water production plant and a heavy-water reactor, 
designated as IR-40.222 Concerns exist over the reactor’s reported plutonium production 
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rate of 9 kg of plutonium per year, but currently Iran does not have a plutonium 
separation or reprocessing capability.223 IR-40 is under IAEA safeguards, and since 
January 20, 2014, the agency reports that Iran has not installed any major components to 
the reactor.224 Under the JPA, fuel production stopped for Arak with only 10 of 150 
needed fuel assemblies installed.225 Conversely, the heavy-water production plant is not 
under safeguards, but in 2011, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the site. Presently, 
Iran allows inspectors “managed access” to this plant and a heavy-water storage facility 
in Esfahan.226 
D. JOINT PLAN OF ACTION 
Agreed to on November 24, 2013, and effective on January 20, 2014, the Joint 
Plan of Action among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and 
Germany, known as the P5+1 and Iran outlines the responsibilities of both sides to ensure 
that the latter’s nuclear program remains peaceful. The agreement lasts for a six-month 
period with the option of extending the terms in an effort to a “long-term comprehensive 
solution.”227 
To remain faithful to the agreement, Iran is allowed to enrich uranium, but only to 
five percent and will refrain from making “any further advances” at Natanz, Fordow, or 
the Arak reactor.228 Iran agrees that it will not install additional centrifuges, nor operate 
its advanced IR-2 centrifuges. It will dilute half of its 20 percent enriched uranium to no 
more than five percent with the other half going to the TRR. Iran will also grant IAEA 
greater access to its program. In return, Iran will receive sanctions relief with the 
assurance of no new sanctions during the six month period.229 Although Iran has 
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completed or is currently complying with a majority of its Plan of Action commitments, 
IAEA questions and concerns surrounding Iran’s past and current military involvement 
remain unanswered.230 
Despite its cooperation thus far, Iran continues to advance its program. The 
Islamic Republic has increased its production rate and stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched 
uranium and continues to research advanced centrifuge models. While these actions are 
not prohibited by the JPA, Blaise Misztal of the Bipartisan Policy Center argues that Iran 
“is not living up to the spirit of the agreement.”231 He explains that Iran is progressing in 
three areas. First, due to the stoppage of 20 percent enrichment, approximately 1,000 
more centrifuges have increased the 3.5 percent enrichment rate by 13 percent.232 
Second, the Fordow centrifuges now enriching to 3.5 are doing so at a 25 percent faster 
pace than those at Natanz.233 Third, Iran continues to research and develop new 
centrifuges that are more advanced than the original IR-1 design.234 The IAEA assesses 
that Iran enriches natural UF6 with IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6, and IR-6s centrifuges.235 
In addition to continuing its enrichment activities, Iran refuses to adequately 
answer questions regarding the military’s involvement in the nuclear program. The IAEA 
seeks to better understand recent activity, revealed by satellite imagery; past experiments; 
and the role of foreign scientists at the Parchin military complex.236 The IAEA received 
information from multiple countries, which indicated that Iran constructed containers for 
high explosive and hydrodynamic testing connected to nuclear weapons development and 
testing.237 UN Security Council Resolution 1929 requires Iran to provide IAEA access to 
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people, locations, equipment, and information as requested.238 David Albright suggests 
that an uninformative Iran in this regard will have detrimental effects on any long term 
deal. He ponders, “if Iran is able to successfully evade questions about a weapons 
program now, when biting sanctions…are in place, why would it address them when 
these sanctions are lifted?”239 
Iran’s rebuttal to the Parchin allegations is that the information the IAEA acquired 
from others is categorically wrong.240 Despite its hesitancy to discuss past nuclear 
activities, Iran offered general information about its use of detonators that could be used 
to trigger nuclear weapons. In May 2014, Iran informed the IAEA that its use of 
exploding bridge wire detonators was geared toward civilian applications.241 Although 
the Iranians remained silent on their specific use, these devices are sometimes used in 
drilling for oil and gas.242 Furthermore, Iran agreed to inform the IAEA about its research 
regarding high explosives and their use in implosion devices.243 Refraining from 
specifics, the IAEA has reports concerning Iran’s interest in neutron generators, which 
increase the efficiency of nuclear weapons; advanced modeling and computing 
capabilities, which are used in both military and civilian applications; and information 
dealing with uranium conversion to metallic, hemispheric shapes.244 IAEA inspections 
conducted in 2010 revealed that Iran received uranium from China and samples of 
polonium-210, which is used in initiators for nuclear weapons. 245 
                                                 
238 Davenport, “UN Security Council.” 
239 David Albright, “Making Iran Come Clean About its Nukes: What is the Point of Striking an 
Agreement with Iran if Tehran Will Be Able to Hide its Weapons Work?” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 
2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1524268972/8715690F0CDB41B0PQ/1? 
accountid=12702. 
240 Director General, “Implementation of the NPT,” 5. 
241 Kelsey Davenport, “Iran Provides Detonator Details to IAEA,” Arms Control Association, June 
2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_06/news/Iran-Provides-Detonator-Details-to-IAEA. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Nima Gerami, “Background on the ‘Possible Military Dimensions’ of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 13, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/background-on-the-possible-military-dimensions-of-irans-nuclear-program. 
244 Jon Wolfsthal, “Iran and IAEA: On Past Military Dimensions,” The Iran Primer, United States 
Institute of Peace, May 20, 2014, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/may/20/iran-and-iaea-past-military-
dimensions. 
245 Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, 39–40. 
 60 
E. POLITICS 
Since 1979, Iranian leaders have had disagreements on the proper direction of the 
nuclear program. Shahram Chubin suggests that the biggest disagreement is based on 
whether Iran should continue with a revolutionary attitude or assimilate into the 
international community as a “normal state.”246 Prior to 2002, Iranian officials agreed 
that nuclear power represented energy diversification, technological advancement, and a 
must have for “any self-respecting country.”247 
As the Global War on Terror spread throughout the region, Iran’s nuclear 
program gained greater recognition as a potential source of weapons and terrorism. As 
mentioned above, Natanz and Arak were revealed in 2002 and Iran subsequently dealt 
with the E3. Although Iran willingly negotiated with this group, it could not be convinced 
to give up its right to enrich uranium. This period demonstrated that when pressure is 
placed on Iran, the country is willing to negotiate, but only to a certain extent. It also 
showed that Ayatollah Khamenei made the country’s most important decisions. 
Khamenei announced that the voluntary suspension of enrichment insufficiently 
benefitted Iran and issued the order to restart enrichment in late 2005.248 In April 2014, 
Khamenei outlined redlines concerning talks with the P5+1. Although speaking in 
general terms, he stated that nuclear progress should not be “halted or slowed down,” that 
“nuclear achievements” should be defended, and that Iran should only accept a 
“normalized” relationship with the IAEA.249 These demands signify that Iran covets the 
technology and capability to progress its nuclear program as it sees fit. The Supreme 
Leader’s comments also suggest that Iran is unfairly treated by the IAEA. 
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Although Iran suspended its enrichment and conformed to the Additional 
Protocol, these actions were not as genuine as one might believe. In a 2007 interview 
with Hassan Rouhani, the current president and former nuclear negotiator explained that 
Iran continued with the technical aspects of the nuclear process: “we built the centrifuges, 
we built the Arak plant…whatever was incomplete, we completed under the shadow of 
suspension.”250 Rouhani further admitted that he personally conversed with engineers 
and scientists, advising them that when they were prepared to enrich, the regime would 
terminate the suspension.251 Thus, the overbearing proposal by the E3 supplied the 
justification for Iran to restart enrichment with more advanced facilities. Moreover, this 
period represented another example of how Iran will abide by an agreement intended to 
limit its program, but continues to improve its nuclear potential. 
The nuclear issue not only highlights who is in charge, but also the informal, 
personalized landscape of Iranian politics. While the political system maintains many 
powerful offices such as the Assembly of Experts, the Judiciary, Guardian Council, and 
the Expediency Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) holds great 
sway over the direction of the nuclear program. 
Instituted to protect the revolution and the Supreme Leader, the Guard has 
amassed significant military, political, and economic power. The IRGC stakes claim in 
various sectors and provides security, procurement, and research for nuclear matters.252 
Until recently it has spoken out against any negotiations with the West. IRGC Deputy 
Commander, Brigadier General Hossein Salami stated in February 2013 that “we are at 
the apex of our power today and taking the last steps towards victory, and this [P5+1] is 
the final obstacle.”253 Besides continuing the revolution and wanting to defy western 
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influence, the IRGC stresses the need to challenge international norms through its nuclear 
program. Part of this desire is due to economic sanctions that benefit the Corps because it 
not only exploits the government for funds, but also manages Iran’s black market, which 
covers its domestic losses.254 
Recently, Ayatollah Khamenei advised IRGC leader General Mohammad Ali 
Jafari from interfering with negotiations with the P5+1.255 Since November 2013, Jafari 
has obeyed Khamenei and changed his tone from one of outright opposition to arrogant 
optimism. He now views the talks as beneficial to Iran in the long-run. He stated that 
“either the pressures of the sanctions will be relieved or the country’s officials will be 
disappointed at the foreigners and focus on domestic power.”256 
Similarly, Khamenei views sanctions as a mixed blessing. On one hand, he 
believes that they represent an attack on Islam and a tactic to undermine the regime. On 
the other hand, he believes that sanctions have made Iran stronger and more resilient in 
its quest for self-sufficiency.257 Although he distrusts the United States and dislikes 
negotiations, Khamenei explained that he supports talks only if they benefit Iran. This 
means recognizing the regime and Iran’s right to enrich uranium.258 Furthermore, in 
February 2013, he explained that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, not because 
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“if we wanted to make nuclear weapons, how could you prevent it?”259 Khamenei also 
professes that nuclear weapons are “un-Islamic”260 and that “we regard the use of these 
weapons as illegal and haram,” or forbidden.261 
Although Khamenei is in charge, the power struggle between conservatives and 
moderates continues to drive the nuclear issue. Strong consensus exists on preserving the 
right to enrich and generating nuclear energy.262 Iranian officials also believe that their 
country is the “vanguard of an international movement” to rid the region of U.S. 
influence.263 Conversely, disagreement exists over the military’s involvement, costs and 
benefits, and the conditions under which a long-term deal could exist. 
Conservatives are more willing to accept sanctions and costs to society because 
defying the West continues the revolution. Like Khamenei, this group views penalties as 
an attack on Iran’s technological advancement and an attempt to undermine the country’s 
regional influence. Moderates are more open to compromise and view negotiations not as 
a weakness, but as a means to gain greater recognition and integration within the 
internationally community.264 
Presently, it appears that the regime is unwilling to risk further sanctions. 
Although negotiations toward a long term deal continue, Iran has opened its program to 
inspections and stopped its enrichment of 20 percent uranium in exchange for sanctions 
relief. With the surprise election of Rouhani, Khamenei may believe that this is the best 
opportunity to achieve international and domestic victories by diplomatically engaging 
the West and appeasing its population. Sensitive to public sentiment, Rouhani observed 
that “if the country’s political decisions conflict with the public opinion, we definitely 
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would have problems.”265 A November 6, 2013, Gallup article explained that 68 percent 
of Iranians favor a peaceful nuclear program in the face of tough sanctions and only 34 
percent support the development of a military capability.266 
Attempting to gain leverage and respect on the international scene, Rouhani 
shows support for human rights and has increased its participation in UN committees. 
Although they were rejected, the current president proposed Cabinet members 
sympathetic to the Green Movement.267 He also appointed a woman, Elham 
Amindzadeh, as a vice president within his Cabinet.268 Furthermore, Iran is making 
inroads with the UN by acting as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which 
represents 119 of the 193 UN countries. NAM countries defend Iran for standing firm 
against western pressure as the final outcome of the Iranian program could affect their 
own nuclear futures.269 Rouhani also led a nuclear disarmament summit in the General 
Assembly and won the position of rapporteur for the Assembly’s committee on 
Disarmament and International Security.270 
F. CONCLUSION 
Similar to many nuclear power aspirants of the 1950s, Iran took advantage of the 
U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative. Although a revolution and war delayed progress, Iran 
realized that unconventional weapons could be useful. It also confirmed Iranian thought 
that a double standard exists in regards to war and international relations. As Iraq used 
chemical weapons, the world did little to help Iran. The inaction to uphold the “moral 
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principles” of war bred further distrust within Iran of foreigners.271 The war along with 
numerous sanctions and blocked deals proved to Iran that external support could not be 
relied upon for its security needs.272 
Despite sanctions and international condemnation, Iran continues to improve its 
nuclear capabilities. Current deals limit aspects of the program such as enrichment levels 
and facility improvements, but Iran has demonstrated in the past that it will improve on 
other areas not covered by negotiations. While evidence suggests a weapons intention, it 
does not definitively mean that Iran is pursuing such a course, as the decision to achieve 
weapons remains unknown.273 Regardless of the decision, Iran’s efforts to improve its 
nuclear infrastructure allow the country to approach the nuclear threshold. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THRESHOLD STATUS 
A nuclear threshold state is one that could quickly operationalize its “peaceful” 
nuclear program into one capable of producing a nuclear weapon. Japan and Brazil both 
possess advanced technologies and expertise to be considered threshold states. Although 
Iran does not have the facilities the other two have and has restrictions placed on its 
program, it too can be considered a nuclear threshold state. 
A country’s past nuclear weapons program may have contributed to its civilian 
advancements, but does not mean it will ultimately pursue a weapon. Japan, Brazil and 
Iran all had weapons programs and not one currently possesses nuclear weapons. Politics 
also play a role in the nuclear futures of a country. Japan maintains its aversion to nuclear 
weapons for domestic and international reasons. Brazil views its non-nuclear posture as 
more beneficial to its economic and political future than what a nuclear weapon could 
provide. Iran, like Japan and Brazil has a population with mixed feelings about nuclear 
energy, but a majority of its citizens are against nuclear weapons.274 
Nuclear energy and self-sufficiency are important to the three countries and their 
threshold statuses. Although constructing a weapon requires more than the fuel cycle, 
uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are the most difficult parts. According to 
Joseph Cirincione, testing and putting together the components of a bomb design “pale in 
comparison to that of making the fissile material.”275 Former director of the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense Stephen M. Younger agrees 
that the correct amount of nuclear material is difficult to produce, but further explains 
that the device, even a gun-type assembly, thought by many to be fool-proof is no small 
feat.276 Japan has very little domestic energy resources and relies on nuclear energy for a 
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substantial portion of its electricity. Desiring to remain energy independent, Japan 
believes it needed to make the most of its imported uranium and therefore constructed 
reprocessing facilities and breeder reactors that subsequently produced stockpiles of 
plutonium. Although a majority of its reprocessed plutonium is stored in Europe, Japan 
controls more than 10 tons within its borders. This amount is sufficient to fuel more than 
1,000 bombs. 
Similarly, Brazil worries about its energy resources. Citing unpredictable weather 
patterns and fluctuating petroleum prices, Brazilian officials argue that nuclear energy is 
an important source of electricity, although it relies on nuclear energy to produce only 
three percent of its electricity.277 Brazil’s program is not as robust as Japan’s and relies 
on foreigners for a majority of its uranium conversion and enrichment. The small 
percentage of uranium conversion and enrichment that takes place domestically is 
accomplished by the Brazilian Navy. As the first and only non-nuclear weapon state to 
have a program dedicated to a nuclear submarine, Brazil worries nonproliferation 
advocates. Since nuclear propulsion reactors are not covered by the NPT, HEU can be 
produced and stored under the auspices that it will be used for non-explosive purposes. 
Brazil also discusses the importance of self-sufficiency and the discriminatory 
nature of the NPT. From its past, the South American country has learned that relying on 
foreigners for nuclear technology was detrimental to its progress. In the early 1970s, 
Brazil relied heavily on the United States and others for fuel and technology, but since it 
had not yet signed the NPT, both contracts and equipment were denied. To circumvent 
these issues, its military proposed and advanced its nuclear ascendancy through a parallel 
program. Related to its desires for self-sufficiency, Brazil believes that the NPT is 
controlled by the nuclear weapon states and restricts those without weapons. Some 
Brazilians express concern that the NPT is more focused on nonproliferation and less on 
disarmament. Due to this difference, Brazil refuses to sign the Additional Protocol and 
protect its indigenous nuclear technology. 
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Very much like Japan and Brazil, Iran also argues for the benefits of nuclear 
energy. Shah Pahlavi set a trend in Iran when he professed that nuclear energy would free 
up the country’s oil supplies for export. In 2013, Iran’s Energy Minister explained that 
Iran saved $2 billion per year in oil and gas since the Bushehr reactor came online in 
2011.278 Although this is true, Iran’s argument that it is cost effective is untrue. Since 
Iran began its nuclear program in the 1950s, Scott Peterson of The Christian Science 
Monitor suggests that it is impossible to determine the total investment made by Iran thus 
far, but explained that over the last 60 years, Iran has spent more than $100 billion of its 
oil revenues.279 In addition, Peterson noted that relying on domestic facilities for nuclear 
fuel production Iran could spend more than $125 million more than purchasing it from 
other countries.280 Nevertheless it continues to enrich uranium for its “future” reactors 
and make improvements to its heavy-water reactor. 
In addition to its claims of energy security and other motivations such as prestige, 
technical achievement, and economics, Iran cites its rights under the NPT, which allow it 
to develop and maintain nuclear technology as long as it is used for peaceful purposes. In 
its negotiations with the P5+1, Iran remains adamant about its rights regarding uranium 
enrichment and centrifuge numbers. Less than two weeks before the July 20, 2014, JPA 
deadline, Ayatollah Khamenei asserted that Iran will not surrender its right to enrich 
uranium, and further stressed that the country will need many more centrifuges over the 
next two to five years.281 
Although Iran seeks to further its research and development that could produce 
weapons-usable material and has experimented with equipment that is used in nuclear 
weapons, it does not mean that it will ultimately achieve such a device. In addition to the 
difficulty of constructing a nuclear weapon, a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon may 
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not have been made and may never be. As Cohen and Frankel suggest, ambiguity in 
regard to these decisions is an aspect of the threshold state.282 Regardless of what the 
future holds for Iran’s nuclear program, the Center of Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation explains that Iran requires nuclear material, a bomb, and a delivery vehicle 
to weaponize its program.283 
First, there is a need for nuclear material. Secretary of State John Kerry 
announced before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2014 that Iran’s 
breakout capability is approximately two months.284 According to ISIS, Iran could 
produce a significant quantity of weapons-grade uranium within five months.285 This 
accounts for JPA restrictions and Iran’s current supply of enriched uranium. Second, Iran 
requires a warhead. Some experts such as Michael Elleman, a senior fellow at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies claims that the technical skill to construct a 
warhead is not beyond Iran’s capability,286 but Younger refutes this popular notion and 
states that “while some nuclear weapons experts claim that making a primitive nuclear 
explosive is as simple as shooting two slugs of uranium against each other in an old 
artillery barrel, in reality it is much more complicated.”287 Third, Iran would likely use a 
ballistic missile to deliver its nuclear payload. Director of National Intelligence, James 
Clapper informed the Senate Select Committee in January 2014 that Iran has the largest 
inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, and that its Shahab series missiles are capable 
of delivering weapons of mass destruction.288 Despite the lack of an order to weaponize, 
P5+1 attempts to roll-back the program, and estimates that the construction of device 
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ranges from “a couple months…to more than a year,”289 the Islamic Republic has the 
capability to produce a significant quantity of HEU for a nuclear weapon within six 
months. With these capabilities, Iran is a nuclear threshold state. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROLIFERATION 
What does Iran’s threshold status imply for U.S. nonproliferation policy and the 
international nonproliferation regime? First and foremost, Iran must remain below the 
threshold, or as some argue, it could lead to an arms race in the region, a possible 
collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a military attack, or a combination of the three. 
Promoting multilateral and bilateral treaties, security alliances, the NPT and 
IAEA, effective enforcement, and nuclear disarmament, U.S. nonproliferation policy 
seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by assisting those without nuclear 
weapons and reducing the U.S. nuclear weapons inventory.290 Preventing Iran from a 
nuclear weapon is America’s goal, and its strategy is to use a dual-track approach that 
utilizes both diplomacy and sanctions, backed by the threat of military force. The threat 
of Iran’s nuclear future is its potential to become a model for the 24 non-nuclear weapons 
states with civilian programs.291 These are similar to Iran in that they are members of the 
NPT and have or could have future enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. While it is 
unlikely for these states to follow Iran’s approach, some may “develop their present 
peaceful programs with one eye cocked to the future possibility that they may eventually 
decide to develop an operational nuclear capability independently.”292 
While this dual-track method appears to have gotten Iran to at least negotiate with 
the P5+1 and abide by the provisions within the JPA, changes should be instituted. Both 
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the supply and demand side of nuclear technology should be addressed. As the Iran case 
demonstrates, nuclear material and expertise is readily available. Export controls and 
nuclear deals, such as those with Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, and India should be 
heavily scrutinized before finalization. 
Named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, “123 agreements” are 
civilian nuclear cooperation deals between the United States and foreign countries that 
offer technology and material for peaceful purposes. Section 123’s nine provisions on the 
trade of material include the application of IAEA safeguards, the use of material for only 
non-explosive purposes, adequate physical security, U.S. permission for enrichment or 
reprocessing, adequate storage facilities, and the right of the United States to recall its 
material, equipment, or any material produced by its use.293 A 123 agreement only 
applies to the material originating from the United States. Other factors such as human 
rights and past nuclear activities are considered, but depending on U.S. interests and 
nonproliferation concerns, exemptions can be made.294 
Vietnam’s agreement is still under Congressional review, but meets all nine of the 
Atomic Energy Act’s nonproliferation criteria. Although Vietnam states that it has no 
interest in enrichment or reprocessing, Congress should consider binding documentation 
that guarantees such.295 The US-United Arab Emirates nuclear deal of 2009 is viewed by 
some to represent the “new gold standard”296 in 123 agreements. This is because the 
UAE voluntarily renounced enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.297 Although a bill 
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was presented that would make renouncing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities 
mandatory, the 112
th
 Congress rejected the recommendation.298 
Conversely, India’s deal with the Unites States is significantly different than 
Vietnam’s and the UAE’s. First, the agreement had to have exemptions because India is 
not an NPT member state and has exploded nuclear devices. To include India in the 
international nuclear arena, the United States agreed to allow the South Asian country 
access to nuclear markets and a reprocessing capability in exchange for placing some of 
its reactors and its future reprocessing facilities under IAEA safeguards.299 In addition, 
India agreed to continue its weapons test moratorium, support efforts toward a Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty, separate its military and civilian programs, and commit to signing 
an Additional Protocol.300 
Although the differences among these deals may be advantageous to the United 
States, giving one country one thing and forbidding it from others creates feelings of 
resentment and demonstrates that the nuclear suppliers or the United States distinguishes 
between good nuclear programs and bad ones. George Perkovich and others state that “as 
each deal is cut it sets a new expectation for the next proliferator.”301 Despite the need for 
stringent universal standards, rewarding states that uphold nonproliferation norms and 
values could be an incentive to refrain from questionable nuclear practices such as 
enriching more uranium than is necessary or leaving questions of military involvement 
unanswered.  
Consensus should be generated to control the means of producing fuel for nuclear 
reactors. Strengthened export controls, international fuel banks, and a Fissile Material 
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Cutoff Treaty could hinder access. In 2004, President Bush stated that countries seeking 
nuclear energy do not require enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.302 Management 
of the fuel cycle could be handled by international agencies that guarantee the delivery of 
reactor fuel and the disposal of spent fuel at a price that benefits the state. The use of 
these services from a nuclear energy seeking state could confirm its nonproliferation 
commitment and reduce the argument that nuclear energy is economically beneficial.303 
Some countries, such as Iran argue that their NPT rights are being infringed upon 
and international entities cannot be trusted to fulfill peaceful nuclear demands.304 To 
combat this dilemma, the agency could be run by an international organization such as 
the IAEA and guarantee fuel at reduced prices through long-term contracts. To prevent 
political disruptions to supply, the fuel bank system should be arranged in a fashion that 
separates the suppliers from the consumers. The suppliers should only provide nuclear 
fuel and not dictate who gets what or how much, this would be arranged by the consumer 
and international organization. 305 
Although one aspect of fuel banks is to postpone enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities, it is unfair to demand that NPT member states give up their nuclear rights. 
Countries should be able to pursue peaceful nuclear endeavors, but also should 
accomplish them under strict transparency. While some countries believe that using a fuel 
bank means they need to give up enrichment and reprocessing, the IAEA states that “the 
rights of the member state… shall remain intact and shall not in any way be compromised 
or diminished by the establishment of international assurance of supply mechanisms.”306 
In effect the fuel bank promotes energy security for developing countries by offering 
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LEU and encouraging nonproliferation by reducing the need for advanced fuel cycle 
capabilities without denying members their NPT rights. 
Committing to a fissile material cutoff that prohibits the production of HEU and 
plutonium, would signal that states are serious about reducing weapons grade material 
and that weapons arsenals are limited.307 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review adds that a 
fissile material cutoff treaty would enhance U.S. security and nuclear stability throughout 
the world.308 
In addition, tougher regulations focused on nonproliferation should be 
complemented with efforts by the weapons states to disarm. According to Cirincione, 
nuclear weapons, similar to biological and chemical, need to become universally 
rejected.309 This means that the United States and the rest of the nuclear weapon states 
would be required to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Although total elimination is not 
likely to occur soon, continued reductions could reaffirm weapons states’ disarmament 
commitments and strengthen the NPT. In addition to numbers, the prestige these weapons 
possess should be minimized and the benefits of not obtaining them or the option of 
possession should be promoted. In addition, the U.S. should publicize efforts to transform 
HEU and plutonium to non-weapons uses and utilize a transparent program that allows 
others to understand its disarmament.310 
The demand for competencies leading to the threshold and nuclear weapons 
capabilities also should be reduced. Thirty years ago, Smith and Rathjens understood this 
concept and argued that “the best hope of stemming nuclear proliferation lies in dealing 
effectively with the motives that lead nations to want to have nuclear weapons.”311 
Nuclear weapons proponents within states should be weakened, while opponents should 
be strengthened. International institutions could provide positive and negative incentives 
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in areas that are related to a state’s nuclear program.312 These include banking, trade, 
health, education, human rights, and the military. Iranian human rights activist, Shirin 
Ebadi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 in an effort to strengthen human rights 
groups. As Etel Solingen argues, “the stronger these constituencies become, the less 
willing they will be to bear the economic, social, and political consequences of nuclear 
programs and the external instability they often induce.”313 In addition, it is important to 
have insight into a country’s political economy and nuclear policy relationship, as this 
could lead an understanding of its nuclear desires.314 It could also reveal vulnerabilities, 
which nonproliferation efforts could focus on. 
Furthermore, the United States should reaffirm its security alliances with its allies 
and promote security cooperation based on mutual interests with others. This could dispel 
security fears that others claim to justify an infrastructure that could lead to weapons 
production. Some argue that reductions in the U.S. arsenal would lessen the reliability of 
its nuclear umbrella that protects and prevents some of its allies from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. James Schlesinger testified to the House Armed Services Committee that of all 
the countries that enjoy the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, Japan is the most 
likely to go nuclear if it loses confidence in U.S. protection.315 Since the two concluded 
its Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, Japan has occasionally voiced its 
concerns surrounding the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but still does not have 
nuclear weapons. In 1960, the United States had more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, 
which equated to roughly 93 percent of the world’s total.316 From its peak in 1966, the 
U.S. has reduced its arsenal from more than 32,000 weapons to approximately 7,400 
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today.317 This latter figure represents approximately 45 percent of the world’s nuclear 
weapons. Since 1960, the total number of nuclear weapons states increased by five, 
including Japan’s neighbors China and North Korea. Aside from Japan’s domestic stance 
on nuclear weapons, these numbers suggest that further reductions to the U.S. arsenal will 
not force Japan into starting a nuclear weapons program. 
This does not mean that the U.S. should eliminate its arsenal overnight. Rather, it 
should continue to work with its allies and steadily reduce the inventory. With a smaller 
arsenal, the United States could still affirm its security commitments for its allies by 
utilizing its superior conventional forces and maintaining a presence in tenuous areas. 
Similarly, the United States should promote stability by developing assistance programs 
that could lead to understanding, cooperation, and integration into the global community 
for those states, which harbor potentially destabilizing nuclear aspirations.318 These 
incentives could persuade some to refrain from nuclear capabilities related to the full fuel 
cycle. In addition, they could be diminished or revoked if a state began to conduct 
nuclear experiments. 
The United States and the rest of the world’s responsibility is to reduce future 
proliferation by working with these countries and preventing them from reaching the 
threshold. In this realm the United States should take a leading role and form a consensus 
that stronger methods of nonproliferation need to be implemented. After all, the U.S. 
Department of Defense 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report states that nonproliferation 
merits a “priority atop the U.S. nuclear agenda.”319  
Although its leadership is important, the United States should refrain from 
dominating efforts in a way that could cause others to perceive it as acting alone or in its 
own self-interest.320 The United States should continue to use multilateral approaches 
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and include developing countries with similar interests that could take leading roles to 
prevent others from developing nuclear programs capable of reaching the threshold. This 
appears to make sense because in the context of nuclear proliferation, these states seem to 
have more in common with others, particularly their non-nuclear weapons state status. 
Conversely, the United States is often accused of dictating negotiations, which 
strengthens the argument that the NPT and nonproliferation regime is discriminatory. 
The United States should be more proactive in disarmament efforts. Currently, it 
possesses 4,804 nuclear warheads321 ready to be delivered and another 2,600 in 
retirement status. Rather than reducing the amount of deployed warheads and delivery 
vehicles stated in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, the 
United States could unilaterally destroy warheads. Dismantling these weapons may have 
a greater psychological impact on non-nuclear weapons states then eventual arsenal 
reduction due to retirement of aging systems.322 This could have a two-fold impact. First, 
it could signal to the world, such as President Obama’s speech did, that the United States 
is committed to nonproliferation. Second, it could lower the prestige these weapons have 
affixed to them in terms of security and international respect. Reducing the number of 
warheads would complement the Nuclear Posture Review’s negative security assurance. 
Some nuclear analyst view this concept as a way the United States is reducing its reliance 
on nuclear weapons as a deterrent and eliminating situations in which weapons would be 
used.323 
The United States should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
that outlaws nuclear explosive testing. Ratification would strengthen the nonproliferation 
regime by increasing the costs of conducting a test. Although a successful test could 
reveal competence, under a CTBT a test would violate an international treaty. This 
breach could therefore cost the state in terms of prestige, sanctions, and isolation.324 In 
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March 2012, the National Academy of Science encouraged the CTBT’s ratification by 
explaining that as long as the United States dedicates resources for the nuclear field, its 
technical supremacy will not suffer.325 
If the United States is serious about being a leader of nonproliferation, it is going 
to have to make major adjustments to its own policy. Its commitment to disarmament 
should show tangible results that occur quickly rather than being initiated in years or 
decades in the future. The United States should pursue a “world without nuclear 
weapons,” but publically forgo the promotion of a “safe, secure, and effective arsenal to 
deter any adversary.”326 Another major hurdle for U.S. efforts will be forming a 
consensus with others to hold nonproliferation standards to the level the United States 
has. This will prove especially difficult in the transfer of nuclear material and equipment 
that could be used to produce economic benefits to the seller. This will include 
convincing others that it is necessary to sacrifice billions of dollars for infrastructure to 
stem the supply side of nuclear material. It will be tedious and require long-term 
commitments from all states with nuclear capabilities and aspirations, but a starting point 
that demonstrates serious results is essential. 
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